Writing the Nation: National Historiographies and the Making of Nation States in 19th and 20th Century Europe

General Editors: Stefan Berger, Christoph Conrad and Guy P. Marchal

National histories form an important part of the collective memory of the peoples of Europe and national bonds have been, and continue to be, among the strongest bonds of loyalty. This new series is the main outcome of a five year research programme funded by the European Science Foundation between 2003 and 2008 entitled 'Representations of the Past: The Writing of National Histories in 19th and 20th Century Europe'.

As a transnational and comparative investigation, this series will explore the structures and workings of national histories; enhance our understanding of the diversity of national narratives in Europe; and open up a dialogue for understanding among European nation states. In particular, the books will bring together the histories of Western and Eastern Europe in an attempt to bridge the historiographical divide cemented by the long division of the continent by the Cold War.

The series will compare the role of social actors and institutions, as well as the importance of diverse narrative hierarchies in nationally constituted historiographies. It attempts to organize the comparison between historiographical and other representations of the past in order to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of diverse forms of representation within specific historical cultures. It promotes comparisons between different nationally-constituted historical cultures in order to take account of their various contexts, interactions, exchanges, misunderstandings and conflicts.

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The Past as History

National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Modern Europe

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For Guy Marchal, in friendship and gratitude

Ihr stützt Euch auf Geschichte,
Und sucht nicht was ihr suchen sollt,
Und finded was Ihr finden wollt –
Das nennet ihr Geschichte!
Und das Alte gehet doch zunichte.

You rely on history,
But you do not seek what you should seek,
And you find what you wish to find –
That you call history!
And the past will still fall to pieces.

Hoffmann von Fallersleben, 'Die historische Schule'.
From *Unpolitische Lieder*, vol. 2 (Hamburg, 1841), p. 51.

What's past is prologue.

William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*

Contents

List of Illustrations viii

Preface ix

List of Abbreviations xii

1 Introduction – Constructing the Nation through History 1

2 National History Before the Nation State – from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment 28

3 The Invention of European National Traditions During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century 80

4 Scientificity and Historiographical Nationalism, 1850–1914 140

5 National Histories in and between the World Wars 226

6 National Histories from post-Second World War to post-Cold War 285

7 Conclusion – What Balance Sheet and What Future for National Histories? 358

Appendix: National Historians in Europe 380

References 484

Index 536

5
National Histories in and between the World Wars

Introduction

In 1915 Friedrich Meinecke (1862–1954) published a collection of his speeches and articles that justified the German war effort by reference to German history, which he interpreted as a long search for national independence against foreign enemies. The wars of liberation against Napoleon in 1812/13, the revolution of 1848, the wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870/71) were all stepping-stones to realising the sovereign German nation state representing a unique spiritual heritage that was superior to all other national essences. Meinecke saw the specific German national character rooted in the combination of inner freedom (*Innerlichkeit*) and the ability to sacrifice selfish desires for the good of the community. In contrast to the historically developed higher German form of humanity stood the humanity of the 'West' which Meinecke identified with uniformity, egotism and degeneracy.[1]

Meinecke was just one of a host of German intellectuals who lent their pens to the German war effort. They styled the war into a war of two cultures. It was a war, in the words of Werner Sombart (1863–1941), of heroes against merchants; a war in which the profundity of German culture was pitted against the shallowness of Western civilisation; a war in which the ideas of 1914 stood against the ideas of 1789. And it was a war in which 'perfidious Albion' was pulling the strings to destroy her most powerful challenger on the continent.[2] The famous *Aufruf an die Kulturwelt* (*Appeal to the Cultural World*), signed by 93 of the most internationally renowned German scholars on 4 October 1914, justified German militarism as the country's only protection against 'predatory invasions'.[3] Friedrich Meinecke,

[1] Friedrich Meinecke, *Die deutsche Erhebung von 1914. Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Stuttgart, 1915).
[2] Matthew Stibbe, 'German Historians' Views of England During the First World War', in: Stefan Berger, Peter Lambert and Peter Schumann (eds), *Historikerdialoge. Geschichte, Mythos und Gedächtnis im deutsch-britischen kulturellen Austausch, 1750–2000* (Göttingen, 2003), pp. 235–54.
[3] Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg von Pürkel and Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg, *Der Aufruf an die Kulturwelt; das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 1996).

standing beside Karl Lamprecht (1856–1915), Max Lenz (1850–1932), Eduard Meyer (1855–1930) and Martin Spahn (1875–1945) belonged to the group of historians who signed the appeal. Historians like Lamprecht openly justified German hegemony in Europe with reference to the superiority of the German national character: 'it is subjectively recognised and objectively proven that we are capable of the highest achievements in the world and must therefore be at least considered entitled to share in world rule ... it is not only geographically that the Germanic races under German leadership will become the central people of the old European world.'[4]

In June 1915, the so-called Seeberg Address of German intellectuals demanded the annexation of Belgium, north-eastern France and vast parts of Eastern Europe and Russia, where the Russian population was to be ethnically cleansed and sent to Siberia in order to make way for German settlers. A large number of historians, including Georg von Below (1858–1927), Erich Brandenburg (1868–1946), Kurt Breysig (1866–1940), Richard Fester (1860–1945), Otto Hintze (1861–1940), Arnold Oskar Meyer (1877–1944), and Dietrich Schäfer (1845–1929) signed this document, a testimony to exuberant war-time German nationalism. There were exceptions to the rule, such as Veit Valentin and Ludwig Quidde, but the overwhelming majority of historians supported the German war effort uncritically.[5]

As the reaction of German historians to the outbreak of war indicates, the First World War marks the culmination of nineteenth-century historiographical nationalism. Hence, we shall begin this chapter by surveying the extent to which historians contributed to the war-time mobilisation of their respective nations. The First World War continued to engage the minds of many historians in the interwar period, which saw a major transnational debate on the question of war guilt and the justification of the peace treaties of 1919. The chapter will trace those debates as prime example of the continued purchase of historiographical nationalism on diverse European historiographies in the interwar period. The history wars surrounding the question of war guilt highlighted the strong link between history writing and politics, and we will give a range of examples where historians acted as, and in some cases actually became, politicians.

The end of the First World War also saw the end of empires in Eastern Europe and the emergence of a whole range of new nation states. As we shall see, those nation states were quick off the mark in establishing historical institutions which not only played an important role in professionalising historical writing, but also in providing the new states with historical legitimacy. The border between politics and history remained porous.

[4] Karl Lamprecht in *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, 28 August 1914, cited in Matthew Stibbe, *German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 54.
[5] Klaus Böhme (ed.), *Aufrufe und Reden deutscher Professoren im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 125–35.

After the old Europe had disappeared at the end of the First World War, the liberal national historiographies of the long nineteenth century found themselves under attack from the political left and right. The chapter will discuss at some length the various ideological commitments of national history writing in this period. We will track the fate of the beleaguered liberal national master narratives and its fascist and Communist challengers. It was not just right-wing and left-wing politics that made life difficult for liberal national historiographies. The continued purchase of religion over national master narratives also frequently acted as a brake on the success of liberal national histories. Given the fact that the map of Europe after 1919 looked considerably different from the map of Europe before 1914, the chapter will also pay special attention to borders and borderlands and their impact on historiographical nationalism. Finally, both the fascist and the Communist regimes produced substantial exile historiographies and we will conclude the chapter by reviewing the importance of such exile traditions for national histories.

Historians and the First World War

In the literature on the outbreak of the First World War, we find a widespread assumption that intellectuals yearned for war in 1914. Many allegedly saw war as the great liberating experience, which would end the crisis of a stale and stuffy bourgeois world order and break through to a new age of heroism that was to end the mechanistic and soulless modernity that had accompanied capitalism and found expression in the consumerism of the early twentieth century. There is, however, little evidence that historians longed for war. But when war came, they were ready to defend their respective nations with their pens, and some of the younger ones even exchanged the pen for the sword. The historians' role as prophets of the nation state found ample expression during the conflict. In the belligerent countries, historians like many other scholars and intellectuals, signed petitions, made speeches and published pamphlets to justify their countries' involvement and denigrate the enemy's claims. We opened this chapter by highlighting the strong support of the German historical profession for their country's war effort. How do things look, one might ask, for other belligerent nations?

In Britain, historians defended the decision of the British government to go to war with Germany.[6] The philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) was one of the few dissenting voices. The University of Oxford's Faculty of Modern History published a pamphlet immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in which they argued that Britain was upholding the international rule of law against the authoritarian and militarist étatisme of Germany.[7] The vast majority of British historians before the First World War had been pro-German.[8] Many, who had

[6] Stuart Wallace, *War and the Image of Germany. British Academics, 1914–1918* (Edinburgh, 1988).
[7] *Why We Are At War. Great Britain's Case*, by members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History (Oxford, 1914).
[8] Steven W. Siak, '"The Blood That is in Our Veins Comes from German Ancestors": British Historians and the Coming of the First World War', *Albion* 30:2 (1998), pp. 221–52.

admired German historiography, now argued that two Germanies existed: a cultural and a militarist one. In 1914, they insisted, militarism had won the upper hand against culture, and it was this militarism which needed to be defeated.[9] The Manchester-based historian Ramsay Muir (1872–1941) wrote in the autumn of 1914 that the origins of the war lay in 'a poison which has been working in the European system for more than two centuries, and the chief source of this poison is Prussia.'[10]

For some, the war was not just a necessary evil to combat German barbarism, it was also a means to renew British nationalism. As the Oxford historian Arthur Lionel Smith (1850–1924) wrote in 1916:

> War is indeed a mighty creator. It is an intellectual awakener and a moral tonic. ... It creates a conscious unity of feeling which is the atmosphere needed for a new start. It purges away old strifes and sectional aims, and raises us for a while into higher and purer air. It helps us to recapture some of the lofty and intense patriotism of the ancient world. It reveals to us what constitutes a modern nation, the partnership between the living, the dead, and the yet unborn.[11]

It was not just the ancient world that historians were rediscovering amidst the mechanical mass killing in the First World War. The outburst of historiographical nationalism in war time in both Britain and Germany also found expression in the common idealisation of the remote past of the middle ages as an age of heroism and chivalry most akin to the contemporary age.[12]

In France, published opinion portrayed the entire nation overcoming its internal rifts and joining forces in an *union sacrée* directed against the common enemy east of the Rhine.[13] Historians played their part here as well. Ernest Lavisse and Charles Seignobos (1854–1942) were prominent members of the Comité de publication des lettres à tous les Français that attacked Germany for its militarism and aggressive national character which, they argued, had found expression in thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Heinrich von Treitschke or Friedrich von Bernhardi (1849–1930). Lavisse, in particular, as a historian who specialised in Prussian-German history, collected a vast amount of material from German war propaganda, which formed the base for his own counter-propaganda. Writing regularly in one of the most important periodicals of the French Third Republic, the *Revue de Paris*, and editing the brochures entitled *Lettres à tous les Français*, of which 3

[9] The historian and social reformer William Harbutt Dawson (1860–1948) is a typical example of such an admirer of Germany who, in wartime, took refuge to the idea of 'two Germanies'. See Stefan Berger, 'William Harbutt Dawson and Germany in the Interwar Period', *English Historical Review* 116:1 (2001), pp. 76–112.
[10] Ramsay Muir, *Britain's Case against Germany: an Examination of the Historical Background of the German Action in 1914* (Manchester, 1914), p. vii.
[11] Cited in Wallace, *War*, p. 77.
[12] Stefan Goebel, *The Great War and Medieval Memory: War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914–1940* (Cambridge, 2006).
[13] René Rémond, *L'Anticléricalisme en France de 1815 à nos jours* (Paris, 1976), p. 236 f.

million copies had been sold by 1916, he hammered home his message about the barbarity of German nationalism aiming at nothing less than the enslavement of Europe. German imperialism was described as cannibalistic. The country, he argued, had long prepared for this war. Germans thought of their nation as superior to others and in possession of a godly mission to conquer the world. The German national character was characterised by presumptuousness and arrogance. The brutality of German warfare, e.g. the Belgian atrocities, was depicted as a direct consequence of German disregard for other cultures and peoples. Whilst most of what he wrote during the war was overtly propagandistic, Lavisse also published a brief history of Prussia in 1915, which had some scholarly pretensions. Here he summarised the rationale of the Prussian state as militarism and conquest. It was a sign of the importance of Lavisse to the French war propaganda that he was asked to give the opening address to the *manifestation nationale* of 7 March 1917 in the main lecture hall of the Sorbonne. With important politicians and intellectuals of the republic in attendance, Lavisse aimed to rally the war-weary French, and it gave him another opportunity to speak against the militaristic and barbaric national character of the enemy.[14]

The Belgian historian Henri Pirenne (1862–1935) had dismissed the warnings he received from his son just before the outbreak of the First World War that a militarist spirit held sway in Germany and was all the more shocked by the nationalism that captured the minds of his closest friends among German historians in August 1914. When Lamprecht justified the annexation of Belgium and came to Brussels in the war to convince Belgian intellectuals to adhere to Germany, Pirenne broke with him, despite the fact that he had been a close friend for many years and had played a crucial role in making Lamprecht a member of the Belgian Académie Royale in 1903. When the German occupants promoted the Flemish nationalist movement in Belgium and introduced Dutch as the language of instruction at the University of Ghent, Pirenne, together with his colleague Paul Frédericq, protested and they were both promptly deported to Germany as prisoners of war in 1916. Despite energetic protests from historians all over the world, the Germans were to hold Pirenne captive until the end of the war. As he saw his own life story coincide with the story of his nation, Pirenne came to the conclusion that his pre-war trust in German historiography had been misplaced. German historians' alliance with ethnic nationalism had led them astray, and the only conclusion for other historians was that they had to 'unlearn' from German historiography. He had styled himself as a bridge between German and French historiography before the war; Pirenne now differentiated sharply between Western (French and British) historiography and German history writing, leaving absolutely no doubt that, in his opinion, historiography's future lay with the former and not the latter.

Such reassessment of German historiography necessitated Pirenne's own scholarly reorientation, which resulted in a major reworking of his magnum

[14] Gerd Krumeich, 'Ernest Lavisse und die Kritik an der deutschen "Kultur", 1914–1918', in: Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (eds), *Kultur und Krieg: die Rolle der Intellektuellen, Künstler und Schriftsteller im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1996), pp. 143–54.

opus, the *Histoire de Belgique* (*History of Belgium*). He had started conceptualising this national history with his 1899 lecture that he gave at the invitation of the Belgian Minister of the Interior and Education. Here he first expressed the idea that Belgium, as worthy successor to the Burgundian state, should be seen as a borderland between France and Germany, in which different ethnic groups lived peacefully side by side. He had expanded on this theme in a one-volume national history of Belgium, written at the request of Lamprecht and first published in German in 1899. In the first four volumes of his French-language multivolume Belgian history that he wrote, to much acclaim, before the First World War, he set out to describe these ethnic groups in greater detail. After the First World War he completely reworked his national history and de-ethnicised it, removing systematically all references to ethnicity.[15]

Moving from Western to Eastern Europe, we find a similar readiness of historians to support the war efforts of their respective governments. There does not seem to be much literature on the reaction of Russian historians to the First World War, except general references to most of them supporting the war effort. Some were active in the Union of Towns and Zemstvos, a voluntary organisation whose members were critical of what they saw as the bureaucratic stranglehold over the war effort and partly attempted to formulate an alternative, more liberal

Figure 13 Henri Pirenne (1862–1935) as prisoner of war in Germany. Courtesy of Stadsarchief Brugge (City Archives Bruges) – Fonds Zeebrugge

[15] Peter Schöttler, 'After the Deluge: the Impact of the Two World Wars on the Historical Work of Henri Pirenne and Marc Bloch', in: Berger and Lorenz (eds), *Nationalizing the Past*, pp. 404–25; Jo Tollebeek, 'At the Crossroads of Nationalism: Huizinga, Pirenne and the Low Countries in Europe', *European Review of History* 17:2 (2010), pp. 187–215.

nationalism to the one espoused by the Romanov regime. However, there were hardly any dissenting voices as such.[16]

In the Habsburg empire, many of the German-speaking historians felt enthusiastic about the alliance with Imperial Germany and used the image of Nibelungen loyalty to describe their hopes for a lasting division of labour which would ensure the hegemony of Germandom in Europe. Whilst they argued that a German-dominated Habsburg empire, in alliance with the Magyars, would have the task of ensuring the German domination over South-Eastern Europe, the German empire in the north would take care of North-Eastern Europe and the German 'hereditary enemy', the French. The popularity of Friedrich Naumann's (1860–1919) Central European project *Mitteleuropa* (Central Europe) was a clear sign that the war was to seal German hegemony in Europe. The civil war of 1866 was to be forgotten in the new-found unity and harmony of August 1914. As the Catholic historian Spahn wrote in October 1914: 'We stand anew on stable ground designated by history! It again bands us together with the Austrians in complete harmony ... For the historian it has something of compelling magnificence that the stream of German history has flowed back into its mighty bed.'[17]

However, many Austro-German historians also emphasised the new-found unity between the nationalities of the empire. An appeal to state patriotism that ignored the national rivalries and identities within the empire was perhaps based on wishful thinking, but at least many of the Hungarian historians in the Habsburg empire rallied to the cause of the war. However, they did so less with reference to pan-Germanism than to ideas about Hungary's traditional role in defending western liberty against eastern barbarism. Alluding to Hungary's centuries-old struggle against the Ottoman empire, Hungarian historians constructed a contemporary parallel to the struggle against Russia. There were undoubtedly some tensions between Hungarian and German historians in the empire, which showed, for example, in the far more cautious reception of Naumann's ideas amongst Hungarian historians, who feared German dominance in East-Central Europe and its consequences for a Hungarian nation.[18]

In the country that entered the conflict somewhat belatedly, Italy, some of the most prominent historians supported the war effort. Gaetano Salvemini (1873–1957), a historian with socialist sympathies, came to see the war as the 'fourth war of independence' that Italy had to fight to achieve national unity. His personal dislike of the Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti (1842–1928) undoubtedly contributed to his rejection of the neutralist stance. Some socialist historians, who were, on

[16] I am grateful to Peter Gatrell and Alexei Miller for providing me with this information on Russia.
[17] Martin Spahn, 'An den Pforten des Weltkrieges', *Hochland*, October 1914, p. 20 f.
[18] Jan Vermeiren, 'Brothers in Arms: the Dual Alliance in World War One and German National Identity', University College London PhD thesis, 2009; see also Stephen Verosta, 'The German Concept of Mitteleuropa, 1916–1918 and its Contemporary Critics', in: Robert A. Kann, Béla K. Király and Paula S. Fichtner (eds), *The Habsburg Empire in World War I* (New York, 1977), pp. 203–20.

the whole, not very influential at the universities, followed Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) in supporting the war effort. Corrado Barbagallo (1877–1952), for example, founded a historical journal in 1917, entitled *Nuova Rivista Storica* (*New Historical Review*), which sought to combine support for the war effort with an espousal of blatant nationalism. Giaocchino Volpe (1876–1971), an ardent nationalist with sympathies for the political right, wrote in favour of Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, as he saw the war as an opportunity to modernise Italy and catapult the country into the twentieth century. However, Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) was opposed to Italy's entry into the war. When it happened, he went to Rome, where, as senator, he voted for empowering his government to take all necessary measures, but personally he adopted a somewhat fatalistic stance. He wrote a number of articles highlighting the contribution of German idealist philosophy to the progress of mankind and endorsing the unity of European civilisation. Throughout the war he refused to lend his pen to the war-time propaganda of his government.[19]

The examples of Croce and Pirenne above show that the historiographical nationalism that we can find in all belligerent countries had its limits. Both the British Academy and the Berlin Academy did not exclude those of their members belonging to the 'enemy nations'. The Académie des Inscriptions et des Belles Lettres was selective in excluding only the most rabid of German nationalists amongst German scholars. And throughout the period 1914 to 1918 individuals such as Hans Delbrück (1848–1929) in Germany or Elie Halévy (1870–1937) in France insisted on the existence of an international community of scholars that transcended the war.[20] Franz Schnabel (1887–1966), himself stationed as a soldier in Cambrai, stayed clear of outbursts of German nationalism. Whilst he undoubtedly supported the German war effort, he also continued to believe in a united European culture which encompassed all of the belligerent nations.[21] Such continued adherence to the values of internationalism, especially where a common ethos of the historical profession was concerned, would lead to the rebuilding of transnational historiographical networks after 1918.

Yet, as the end of the war came into sight, another mobilisation of historical expertise for nationalist purposes began to take place in all the belligerent countries. In April 1918, the British government, for example, set up the Political Intelligence Department (PID) in the Foreign Office. It was keen to recruit historians as they were perceived to be useful in legitimating the British war effort and preparing the peace negotiations. Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975), Lewis Namier (1888–1960) and Alfred Zimmern (1879–1957) all served their government in this department,

[19] I am extremely grateful to Edoardo Tortarolo, who provided much of the information on the attitude of Italian historians towards the First World War. See also Fabio Fernando Rizi, *Benedetto Croce and Italian Fascism* (Toronto, 2003), pp. 27–31; Antonio Casali, *Storici italiani fra le due guerre. 'La nuova rivista storica', 1917–1943* (Napoli, 1980).
[20] Georg G. Iggers, 'Historians Confronted with the War', *Storia della Storiografia* 42 (2002), p. 13.
[21] Thomas Hertfelder, *Franz Schnabel und die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft, vol. 1* (Göttingen, 1998), pp. 126–40.

attempting to achieve the best results for Britain at the peace conferences in 1919.[22] Other countries made use of their historical expertise in similar ways. It was to foreshadow one of the most important history wars in Europe.

The War Guilt Debate

After the First World War, all states published substantial document collections that had the explicit purpose of proving their actions right. Whilst they were keen to disseminate this official scholarship nationally and internationally to academic and popular audiences, they also tightly controlled the archives, using censorship, where necessary, in order to prevent other than the officially sanctioned views emerging from the documents. In December 1918, the German Foreign Minister, Dr Wilhelm Solf, expressed his hope that history might contribute to laying the foundations for a lasting peace by bringing to light the truth about the war:

> For the purpose of bringing about universal peace, of insuring lasting guarantees against future wars and of restoring the peoples' confidence in one another, it seems imperatively necessary to throw light on the events which brought on the war, in all belligerent States, and in all their particulars. A complete truthful account of the world conditions and of the negotiations among the powers in July 1914 and of the steps taken at that time by several governments could and would go far toward demolishing the walls of hatred and misconstruction erected by the long war to separate the peoples. In a correct appreciation of the course taken by friend and foe lies the augury for the future reconciliation of the peoples, the one possible foundation for lasting peace and a league of peoples. The German government therefore proposes that a neutral commission be organised to probe the responsibilities for the war, which should be composed of men whose character and political experience will guarantee a true verdict. The Governments of all the belligerent powers should declare their readiness to place at the disposal of such a commission all of their records.[23]

Of course, such a suggestion was born out of defeat, and in the event of a German victory such a pronouncement would have been very unlikely. Indeed, it would appear that nations that lost wars were far more prone to appeal to history in their desire to see historical justice done. After all, between 1910 and 1930 the

[22] The PID was the forerunner of the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD), established in 1942 under proposals from Arnold Toynbee, who was Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). The FORD still provides information which is meant to inform policy decisions today. See Robin R. Hoggard, 'The Research Analysts of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office', *Newsletter of the British International Studies Association* 90 (2007), p. 2 f.

[23] Cited in Keith Wilson, 'Introduction: Governments, Historians, and "Historical Engineering"', in: idem (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory. Government and International Historians through Two World Wars* (Oxford, 1996), p. 10 f.

French published a 29-volume collection of sources on the diplomatic prehistory of the Franco-Prussian war – *Les origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870–1871* (*The Diplomatic Origins of the War of 1870–1871*). And after the First World War Germany was first off the mark in producing a major government-funded source collection on the origins of the conflict, which set out to prove one thing and one thing only: that Germany was not, as article 231 of the Versailles Treaty stated, the sole guilty party in the outbreak of war in August 1914. *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914* (*The High Politics of European Governments, 1871–1914*) was published in 40 volumes between 1922 and 1927, under the general editorship of Friedrich Thimme (1868–1938), who willingly sacrificed his own scholarly standards when they clashed with political expediency.[24]

The planning of the collection started as early as 1919, and a foreign office memorandum of 1921 could not have been clearer on the political functionalisation of history for the interests of the nation: 'The great document publication is not being prepared so that its volumes ... might only gather dust in archives or be studied by isolated historians with effects which will be apparent only after years.'[25] The historians working on it were not given access to the archives of the war office, the navy office and the General Staff, as the foreign office clearly felt that unpalatable facts might surface here. Before embarking on its own collection, the foreign office had put considerable efforts into repressing the separate edition of documents prepared by the socialists Karl Kautsky (1854–1938) and Kurt Eisner (1867–1919) in 1919. The latter had been no less instrumental in their history politics, but they were keen to demonstrate that the elites of the old Imperial Germany had been guilty in provoking war in 1914, and their argument was that the new democratic republic should not be held responsible for the reckless policies of the empire that had been swept away in the German revolution of 1918.

Versailles seemed to prove that the allies were unwilling to make that distinction, and hence the foreign office of the Weimar Republic did everything in its power to dispel the idea of German war guilt – with the help of a small army of historians and archivists. It set up a War Guilt Section in the Foreign Ministry which worked tirelessly to prove 'scientifically' that Germany was not responsible for the outbreak of war in 1914. It published its own journal entitled *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*; it financed a research centre for the study of the causes of the war; it set up the coordination of all those associations which worked on the question of German war guilt and it assisted the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry into the war guilt question. As Holger Herwig (*1941) has argued:

> By selectively editing documentary collections, suppressing honest scholarship, subsidising pseudo-scholarship, underwriting mass propaganda and overseeing the export of this propaganda, especially to Britain, France and the United

[24] Fritz T. Epstein, 'The Accessibility of Source Materials Illuminating the History of German Foreign Policy. The Publication of Documents of the German Foreign Ministry after Both World Wars', in: Robert F. Byrnes (ed.), *Germany and the East* (Bloomington, IN, 1973), p. 174.

[25] Cited in Wilson, 'Introduction', in: idem (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory*, p. 11.

States, the patriotic self-censors in Berlin exerted a powerful influence on public and elite opinion in Germany and, to a lesser extent, outside Germany. Their efforts polluted historical understanding both at home and abroad well into the post-1945 period.[26]

German historians insisted that the pre-war alliance system had led to an encirclement of Germany, which in turn produced a defensive war directed in the main against autocratic Tsarism in Russia.

Germany's opponents in the First World War were slow to react to the challenge of the German historical offensive after 1919, but when they did react they were also not shy in drafting history into the service of the nation. As Austen Chamberlain wrote to George Peabody Gooch (1873–1968) on 30 July 1926: 'My first duty is to preserve peace now and in the future. I cannot sacrifice that even to historical accuracy.'[27] Conditions for research at the British foreign office reflected this attitude: all notes, extracts and transcripts made by historians in the archive had to be seen and approved by foreign office officials, who also reserved their right to veto the publication of anything that was based on their records. The British government had dissolved the PiD in 1919, as it had completed its task in assisting the government in the peace negotiations. After five years, in 1924, the British foreign office finally gave its approval to the preparation of a document collection that it perceived as a reply to the German scholarship, and it asked the internationally renowned and respected G.P. Gooch to head this undertaking. A modest three volumes were to appear by 1927 and the foreign office invested nowhere near as many resources into the undertaking as their Berlin counterparts. As in Germany, some sets of sources remained out of bounds for historians, e.g. the files of the India Office and the Committee for Imperial Defence.

In France it took even longer for the government to put up a counter-project to the German one. In May 1934, Louis Barthou, the Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked on the *Documents diplomatiques français* (*French Diplomatic Documents*) that they were 'of an essentially political significance'.[28] The Commission de Publication des Documents Relatifs aux Origines de la Guerre de 1914–1918 (Publication of the Documents on the Origins of the War of 1914–1918) was set up in 1928 to combat what was perceived as very effective German propaganda. The French ambassador to Berlin, Pierre de Margerie, had already written to his Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, on 3 March 1926:

> There can be no doubt that under the influence of the enormous quantity of documents that the Wilhelmstrasse has thrown on to the historical market, world opinion has already begun to change to our disadvantage. The rapid publication of the documents in our archives relating to the events of 1914, thus demonstrating, particularly to Anglo-Saxon opinion, that we have nothing to fear from the judgements of posterity, would be desirable.[29]

[26] Holger Herwig, 'Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self-Censorship in Germany after the Great War', in: Wilson (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory*, p. 88 f.
[27] Cited in J.D. Fair, *Harold Temperley: a Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm* (Toronto, 1992), p. 199.
[28] Keith Hamilton, 'The Historical Diplomacy of the Third Republic', in: Wilson (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory*, p. 45.

In the Soviet Union it was not a case of justifying the actions of the pre-revolutionary Tsarist government. Rather, the 'red' historians of the Soviet Union were keen to indict the whole pre-war capitalist system for throwing Europe into the cauldron of war. As Michail Nikolaevič Pokrovskij (1868–1932), who chaired the commission which edited the Russian documents, argued:

> We know that the war was not the work of the evil intentions of individual persons and individual groups, but resulted of iron necessity from the economic system of the last decades, the system of monopolistic capitalism. ... The grasping appetites of all imperialistic governments made for war; but none of them acknowledged this nor do so now; they were all, so they say, the victims of the grasping of others. To prove the mania of all imperialistic governments and groups for grasping ... on the basis of documentary material that is unimpeachable and possesses validity for all, is to solve a problem of enormous importance. For the struggle against imperialism, we must know surely and quite exactly how it acts, of what sort are its procedures and methods. And if the grasping activity of imperialists is irrefutably established by a series of incontestable documents, we shall naturally have a bill of indictment – but a bill of indictment not against a single person or even against a single country, but against a class, and that class is the one which in 1914 held power in its hands in all great countries and in most of them still holds it.[30]

Pravda (*Truth*) had already published a series of key documents as early as November and December 1917 which revealed the secret war-time arrangements between the allies. This was followed up with a flurry of document compilations in the 1920s, e.g. the pre-war correspondence between the German Kaiser and the Russian Tsar.

If national historians worked for national governments in the national interest, the whole historians' controversy surrounding the question of war guilt also had a strong transnational dimension to it. So, for example, British and American historians and politicians worked closely together throughout the 1930s in order to ensure that their respective document collections contained nothing that would put the other nation in a relatively bad light. Demands for censorship of manuscripts were complied with as a matter of routine. And the two international pariah states of the interwar period, Germany and the Soviet Union, cooperated over the publication of documents relating to the pre-history of the First World War. Otto Hoetzsch (1876–1946), a historian of Russia, who coordinated these

[29] ibid, p. 44.
[30] Cited in Derek Spring, 'The Unfinished Collection: Russian Documents on the Origins of the First World War', in: Wilson (ed.), *Forging the Collective Memory*, p. 72.

contacts from the German side, expected much from the Russian archives and was convinced that they held the key to proving once and for all that Germany could not be described as the only guilty part in the outbreak of war in 1914. All nations in the interwar period were searching for reciprocal agreements that would allow foreign scholars access to national archives other than their own. The German foreign office often directly supported those foreign scholars whom it perceived to be in sympathy with German demands for a revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty. It provided research materials and funded research trips and lecture tours. The revisionist American historian Harry Elmer Barnes (1889–1968), who had claimed in a series of articles from the 1920s that Russia and France were, above all, to blame for the outbreak of war in 1914, received such help and was, in fact, sent the whole 40 volumes of documents for free. His fellow historian Sidney Bradshaw Fay (1876–1967) as well as a number of public intellectuals such as Edmund Morel (1873–1924) in the UK and Alfred Fabre-Luce (1899–1983) and Victor Margueritte (1866–1942) in France were amongst those deeply influenced by German history politics in the interwar period. The history politics of the victorious allies was arguably less successful, because their publications came later, were much more limited and not as dissemination-oriented as the German efforts. Germany had lost the military war, but it was winning the history war in the interwar period.[31]

Politics and National History Writing

If the war guilt debate revealed the continuing strong links between history writing and politics, we do not have to look far to find many examples of national historians being active as politicians in interwar Europe. In Romania, Nicolae Iorga had been one of the most active participants from his country in world historical congresses. He published most of his work in French and yet was to provide the most influential historical master narrative for his country. He also founded the National Democratic Party in 1910 and served as prime minster of his country between 1931 and 1932. And it was probably more for his politics than his history that he was murdered by the Iron Guard in 1940. Iorga was by no means exceptional among Romania's historians, several of whom served as ministers, members of parliament, or held offices in political parties and the civil administration. When the Communists took power after 1945, they put an unusually high number of historians into jail, as so many had exposed themselves as members of the country's right-wing political elite. (e.g. Gheorghe Brătianu (1898–1953), Alexandru Lapedatu (1876–1950), and Constantin C. Giurescu (1901–1977).[32]

Two of Norway's most famous historians, Halvdan Koht (1873–1965) and Edvard Bull Sr (1881–1932), took office as social democratic foreign ministers in

[31] Generally,for interwar source editions on the First World War, see Sacha Zala, *Geschichte unter der Schere politischer Zensur. Amtliche Aktensammlungen im internationalen Vergleich* (Munich, 2001), pp. 47 ff.

[32] Bogdan Murgescu, 'Romania', in: Ilaria Porciani and Lutz Raphael (eds), *Atlas of European Historiography: the Making of a Profession, 1800–2005* (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 100.

the interwar period, thereby continuing the strong politicisation of Norwegian nineteenth-century historiography. The close alliance between liberal democracy and historiography in the nineteenth century was to give way to an equally strong alliance between social democracy and historiography in the twentieth century.[33]

Some historians were devoted to upholding liberal and social democratic principles in the struggle against fascism in the interwar period. A prominent example is Carlo Rosselli (1899–1937), the founder of Giustizia e Libertà (Justice and Liberty), a centre-left anti-fascist organisation composed of intellectuals, some of whom went on to found the short-lived Partito d'Azione (Action Party) in 1943. Together with his brother Nello Rosselli (1900–1937), who worked under Gioacchino Volpe at the School of Modern and Contemporary History in Rome, they not only took a political stance against Fascism, but also sought to explain the success of Fascism in relation to Italy's somehow deficient national history. The Risorgimento, they argued, had been unfinished, and the claims of the Fascist regime to be the heir of the Risorgimento had to be contested historically. An alternative, republican and socialist Risorgimento had to be upheld against the rival claims of the Fascist state. The Rosellis were influential in defining the anti-fascist struggle as a 'second Risorgimento', a trope that became popular in Resistance circles during the Second World War. It sought to create the unity of the Italian nation on the basis of social justice and emancipation. In 1932 Nello Rosselli founded a journal of nineteenth-century European history which had the explicit aim of freeing contemporary historiography from what he saw as the nationalist virus that had infected all European historiographies in the nineteenth century. Both Rosellis were murdered by cagoulards (French Fascists) in their French exile on the orders of the Fascist regime in Rome. Historiographical nationalism in the interwar period was at its deadliest yet for those who had the courage to oppose it.[34]

Not only left-leaning but also nationalist historians could fall foul of nationalist regimes. In Poland, Wacław Sobieski (1872–1935) became closely associated with the National Democrats under Roman Dmowski after 1918. He published many articles in journals associated with the National Democrats and became a close adviser to the party leadership. The anti-Semitism and anti-Germanism that characterised the National Democrats also found its way into Sobieski's scholarship. At the Paris Peace Conference, he was part of the Polish delegation and argued vociferously for Polish access to the Baltic. In the 1920s he followed this up with several works that sought to underline this claim with reference to historical rights. His party political affiliations coloured his three-volume national history which appeared between 1923 and 1925.When an abridged version of his

[33] Ragnar Björk, 'The Overlapping Histories of Sweden and Norway – the Union from 1814 to 1905', in: Tibor Frank and Frank Hadler (eds), *Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts: Overlapping National Histories in Modern Europe* (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 17–34.

[34] Philip Morgan, 'Reclaiming Italy? Antifascist Historians and History in "Justice and Liberty"', in: Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (eds), *Writing National Histories. Western Europe since 1800* (London, 1999), pp. 150–60.

national history, which appeared in French in 1934, contained a critical remark on Marshall Pilsudski, Sobieski was forcibly retired from Jagiellonian University, despite all of his nationalist credentials.[35] It was a sign of the growing authoritarianism of the Pilsudski regime, which was using contemporary history in a concerted attempt not only to glorify the history of the Polish nation but also initiate a personality cult around Piłsudski. Thus, for example, the Research Institute for Modern History, founded in 1923, became the Pilsudski Institute in 1926.[36]

An even better example of a political regime harnessing the power of history, and historians willingly complying with an outright political role, is provided by interwar Turkey. The vast majority of the younger Turkish historians had joined the Türk Yurdu (Turkish Foyers) just before the First World War, and over the course of the next two decades they were at the forefront of formulating a Turkish historical master narrative in the service of Kemal Atatürk's political regime. After 1931 the official Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish History Society) provided the framework for a number of quasi-offical historical projects. Some of its leading historians, such as Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) or Reşid Saffet Atabinen (1884–1965) later became members of parliament, underlining the proximity of historical studies and politics in the Republic of Turkey. Atatürk personally encouraged the history society to develop the Türk Tarih Tezi (Turkish History Thesis), which argued that Turkish was the original language of mankind and glorified Turkishness as the cradle of humanity. It declared Turks as Aryans and identified contemporary Turks with ancient Hittites, thereby moving the foundation story of Turkey backwards by several centuries. Even the most capable historians were imbued with Turkish nationalism. Fuat Köprülü (1890–1966) became a professor of history at Istanbul University when he was only 23. Methodologically close to the Annales school, his oeuvre included marvelious studies on the economic, social and religious histories of Asia Minor, yet his Turkish national history, published in 1923, was characterised by racialist ideas and a rabid nationalism. It was undoubtedly the latter rather than his historical professionalism which made him change his career: he first became a member of parliament and later Foreign Minister of Turkey.[37]

The Adoption of Historiographical Nationalism by New Nation States after 1918

Historiographical nationalism was not only visible in the history politics pursued by nation states with the active help of historians-cum-politicians. It surfaced

[35] Zdzisław Pietrzyk, 'Wacław Sobieski', in: Peter Brock, John D. Stanley and Piotr J. Wróbel (eds), *Nation and History. Polish Historians from the Enlightenment to the Second World War* (Toronto, 2006), pp. 246–59.
[36] John D. Stanley, 'Introduction', in: ibid., p. 11.
[37] Hans-Lukas Kieser, 'Die Herausbildung des nationalistischen Geschichtsdiskurses in der Türkei (spätes 19.–Mitte 20. Jahrhundert)', in: Markus Kroska and Hans-Christian Maner (eds), *Beruf und Berufung. Geschichtswissenschaft und Nationsbildung in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Münster, 2005), pp. 59–98.

strongly in the many newly founded nation states in East-Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of empires at the end of the First World War. Like the new-found nation states of the nineteenth century, they were investing heavily in the historical sciences and their professionalisation and institutionalisation. Soon after Finland gained independence in 1917, the University of Turku was refounded (in 1920) in order to rival the Swedish-speaking and allegedly unpatriotic university in Helsinki (which had moved from Turku in 1828). The nationalist Finnish intelligentsia organised a nationwide fundraising campaign to endow the university, which was indeed to become one of the bulwarks of Finnish nationalist history, represented by Jalmari Jaakkola (1885–1964), in the interwar period.[38]

After national independence in 1919, Latvian national historians concentrated to a great extent on establishing a Latvian national master narrative and in particular refuting the claims made in Baltic German historiography to their territory. They focused on agrarian history in order to show that the claims of Baltic Germans to the land were spurious and that redistribution of land to Latvian smallholders was historically justified. History found itself again in the service of justifying specific policies of the nation state: and it was rewarded for it. The faculty of philology and philosophy of the University of Latvia, established in Riga in 1919, was to become the generously endowed centre of historical studies in Latvia in the interwar period. In 1936 the Latvia History Institute was founded at Riga with the explicit task, written into its foundational document, of studying 'the past in the light of nationalism and truth'. When Latvian politics became more authoritarian after 1934, historiographical nationalism increased. In 1936 the government forced Leonid Arbusov (1882–1951) to retire because he was supposed to be sympathetic to the Baltic German view of Latvian history. Instead, a view of the past was officially sanctioned which idealised the prehistoric pagan society of the Ur-Latvians who were allegedly committed to social egalitarianism under wise leadership until the Crusaders put an end to it and established colonial rule over Latvia in the thirteenth century. Seven centuries of darkness only came to end with the formation of independent Latvia at the end of the First World War. Such historical views favoured the generous financing of archaeology and prehistory in interwar Latvia, whose research findings were displayed in newly established museums like the State Historical Museum and the Latvia Open-Air Museum. Written sources were edited and published in the twelve-volume *Latvijas vēstures avoti* (*Sources of Latvian History*) and historical journals were founded to publish the research on which the national master narrative was established, e.g. the *Latvijas Vēstures Institūta Žurnāls* (*Journal of the Institute of Latvian History*), or *Senatne un Māksla* (*The Past and Art*).[39]

The institutionalisation and professionalisation of historical writing and its links to legitimation of the nation state were also notable in the other Baltic states. In Estonia, for example, a new historical society was established and the *Ajalooline*

[38] Pertti Haapala and Mervi Kaarninen, 'Finland', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 75.
[39] Andris Šnē, 'Latvia', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 82.

Ajakiri (*Historical Journal*) was founded. It became one of the strongest mouthpieces for the promotion of Estonian nationalism and denied the relevance of the Baltic German alternative. It was aided by the multitude of Estonian national histories and popular source editions which began flooding the market in the interwar period. In 1936, the Estonian academy of science was founded, seeking to contribute further to the professionalisation of the historical national master narrative of Estonia.[40]

The Irish Free State, established in 1922, also saw the emergence of a strongly nationalist professional historiography in the interwar period. Intriguingly, it was modelled on what should have been its arch-enemy, Britain. The Irish Manuscripts Commission was founded as a government-funded agency and it took its cue very much from the British Historical Manuscripts Commission. It was given the task of surveying, editing and publishing documents of national interest located in British and continental European archives. The key historians who were to professionalise Irish historiography from the 1930s onwards, and who laid the groundwork for the Irish national master narrative, were all British-trained. As the Irish Free State lacked well-trained nationalist historians of Ireland, it sent some of its best postgraduates on scholarships to Britain, especially University College London, where they benefited from the Institute of Historical Research (IHR) which had been established at the University of London in 1921. Robert Dudley Edwards (1909–1988) and Theodore William Moody (1907–1984) were arguably the most notable Irish historians to emerge from such training. In 1936 they founded the Irish Historical Society and the Ulster Society for Irish Historical Studies. Two years later, these societies began publishing *Irish Historical Studies*, edited by Edwards and Moody. Entrenched in the bastions of Irish historiography in University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin respectively, both scholars came to stand for a new professional style of history writing based on scientific principles. Yet they managed, like many historians before and after them, to combine their adherence to scientificity with strong doses of nationalism, which was also visible in the way they trained the next generation of scholars, archivists, administrators and schoolteachers in Ireland – putting equal weight on issues of scientificity and nationalism. The latter was recognisable in their insistence that, despite the political division of Ireland, the Republic and Northern Ireland should be treated as one when it came to Irish representation on the International Committee of the Historical Sciences (ICHS). The Irish Committee for Historical Sciences, formed in 1938, and the Ulster Society for Irish Historical Studies (USIHS) sent an equal number of delegates to the International Committee of the Historical Sciences' (ICHS), each delegation funded by the government of its own state. Certainly, many of the textbooks adopted for undergraduate courses in Irish history at the National University of Ireland or in Irish schools were deeply nationalist, e.g. Mary Hayden's (1862–1942) and G. A. Noonan's (1872–1948) two-volume *Short History of the Irish People*, which first

[40] Eduard Mühle, *The Baltic Lands: National Historiographies and Politics in the 'Short Twentieth Century'*, special issue of *Journal of Baltic Studies* 30:4 (1999), pp. 285–92.

appeared in 1920, James Carty's (1901–1989) four-volume *Class-book of Irish History*, or Edward Alfred D'Alton's (1860–1941) multivolume *History of Ireland*.[41]

In the new composite state of Czechoslovakia, the professionalisation and institutionalisation of history writing was also given a major boost by an immediate drive by the state to give itself historical legitimation. Reference to ancient Slavs, Great Moravians, Hussites, the Slavonic congress, the 1848 revolution and the Czechoslovak legions in the First World War all served the purpose of underpinning nation building after 1918. However, such a Czechoslovak national narrative was deeply contested, with Slovak historians, in particular, keeping their distance. Daniel Rapant (1897–1988), for example, vehemently denied the existence of a common Czechoslovak history during the interwar period. He admitted some commonalities, but stressed that overall, the differences were far more important. In particular he denied the notion that the current Czechoslovak state was the direct heir to the state created by the Bohemian crown during the middle ages, as such a construction would make Slovakia a mere appendage of an essentially Czech state.

Given such differences, it is hardly surprising that the institutionalisation of history writing took place along separate Czech and Slovak lines. In Slovakia, the Univerzita Komenského (Comenius University) and the Slovak National Library were founded in Bratislava in 1919. The museum of the Muzeálna spoločnosť slovenská (Slovak Museum Society) transformed itself into the Slovenské národné museum (Slovak National Museum). The archives of the formerly Hungarian counties that comprised post-war Slovakia, were united in the Slovenský krajinský archive (Slovak Country Archive) in 1928. Several historical journals were either newly founded or continued in a more professionalised way. Largely because of the repressive policies of the Hungarian state in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Slovak 'scientific' history could only develop with great difficulty before 1919. Because of the dearth of trained Slovak scholars, new positions were often initially filled by Czech professors; it was only towards the end of the 1920s that Slovak scholars started to replace them.[42] In the Czech lands, the formation of the Czechoslovak state also meant the appointment of more history professors at Czech universities, the foundation of an entirely new history department at Brno university and the establishment of pure research institutes, such as the Istituto Storico Ceco di Roma (Czechoslovak Historical Institute in Rome) which continued the work of the Bohemian branch of the Instituto Austriaco di studi storici (Austrian Historical Institute) going back to the time before 1919. A Československá společnost historická (Society of

[41] Ciaran Brady, 'Arrested Development: Competing Histories and the Formation of the Irish Historical Profession, 1801–1938', in: Frank and Hadler (eds), *Disputed Territories*, pp. 275–302; Mary O'Dowd, 'Ireland', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 172; Steven G. Ellis, 'Historiographical Debate: Representations of the Past in Ireland: Whose Past and Whose Present?', *Irish Historical Studies* 27 (1991), 289–308.

[42] Hudek, 'Slovakia', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 152.

Czechoslovak Historians) was founded in 1935; it held its first national congress in 1937.[43]

The will of newly founded nation states to promote nationalism, including the scientific study of national history, in the interwar period only found its limits in their financial prowess, or rather, the lack of it. Economic crises and instability meant that major investments were often not forthcoming. In some cases, initiatives from within civil society stepped into the breach. In the newly independent Poland, for example, existing scientific societies and historical journals experienced a struggle for survival in the interwar period, as source editions had to be abandoned and journal editors constantly struggled with lack of funds. Nevertheless, a number of new universities were founded, e.g. the Universities in Poznań, Vilnius, and the Catholic University of Lublin. At the University of Warsaw, L'viv and Kraków, new history departments were established. The pre-war Towarzystwo Historyczne (Historical Society) became the Towarzystwo Miłośników Historii (Polish Historical Association) and subsequently the Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne (Polish Historical Society) in 1924, which held national history congresses in 1925, 1930 and 1935 and published its own journal, the *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (*Historical Quarterly*). A good example of how a self-consciously scientific history forged tight links with historiographic nationalism is provided by the Polish constitutional historian Oswald Balzer (1858–1933), who saw his history writing as 'service to the fatherland by advancing the culture which expresses a nation's mind and spirit.'[44] When he died in 1933, the Polish state staged a massive funeral in recognition of his services to Poland.

If the formation of new nation states after the First World War greatly strengthened the link between an institutionalised historical profession and historiographical nationalism, historians promoted nationalism even in places, where the nation state was still a dream of the future. Zionism was able to establish the Hebrew University in Jerusalem under British patronage in 1925. Zionist scholarly organisations going back to pre-First World War Germany had been promoting a Zionist perspective on Palestine by publishing historical maps which showed the historical roots of the Jews in Palestine.[45] After 1925 Zionist historians and

[43] Gernot Heiss, Árpád v. Klimó, Pavel Kolář and Dušan Kováč, 'Habsburg's Difficult Legacy: Comparing and Relating Austrian, Czech, Magyar and Slovak National Historical Master Narratives', in: Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (eds), *The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Religion, Class and Gender in National Histories* (Basingstoke, 2008), pp. 367–404; Pavel Kolar, 'Czech Republic', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 149 f.

[44] Wacław Uruszczak, 'Oswald Balzer (1858–1933)', in: Brock, Stanley and Wróbel (eds), *Nation and History*, p. 217; see also Markus Krzoska, 'Ein Wissenschaftler zwischen Elfenbeinturm und Öffentlichkeit. Der Lemberger Rechtshistoriker Oswald Balzer', in: Markus Krzoska and Hans-Christian Maner (eds), *Beruf und Berufung. Geschichtswissenschaft und Nationsbildung in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Münster, 2005), pp. 239–63.

[45] Markus Kirchhoff, 'From Historical to Political Geography – On the Gentile Roots of Zionist Palestine Maps', unpublished paper presented at ESF workshop in Santiago de Compostela, November 2007.

archaeologists working at Hebrew University laid the foundations for a historical justification of the territorial borders of the future state of Israel.[46]

The tiny nation state of Luxembourg remained somewhat of an exception in Europe in that it did not follow the trend towards greater professionalisation of historical writing in the interwar period. But the nation state arguably did not have to become active here, as vibrant amateur traditions provided a powerful national master narrative. Teachers and priests, in particular, were organised in historical societies which were extremely successful in organising the strong national celebrations that Luxembourg witnessed in 1939.[47]

The Liberal Tradition under Attack: Beleaguered Traditions of National History Writing

Britain did not have the excuse of being a tiny country in Europe, but, as we have highlighted in the last chapter, it was definitely a latecomer when it came to the professionalisation of its historical sciences. It was, of course, far less urgent to provide the nation with scientific historical legitimation in Britain than in many continental European nation states. The nation state was not in question and a homogeneous and strong liberal national master narrative was already in place. In the interwar period we nevertheless see further steps towards greater institutionalisation and professionalisation of historical writing. Albert Pollard (1869–1948) founded the IHR in 1921 in a self-conscious effort to set up an institution which would be able to set the standards for historical studies in Britain. Yet the IHR was by no means state-funded; it was made possible by the endowment of £20,000 by a wealthy neighbour of Pollard's in Putney. The idea was to teach research students around graduate seminars under one or more professors. Pollard had already been the driving force behind setting up the Historical Association in 1906. He also founded its journal, *History* and the IHR's journal, the *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*; in 1921. Pollard was not only a prolific professionaliser, he was also a convinced nationalist. His veneration for the English parliament and constitution were only matched by his ignorance of and dislike for continental Europe and its history.[48]

His efforts to move history to a more professionalised understanding were replicated at the University of Manchester, where Thomas Frederick Tout (1855–1929) put much stall by professionalising the training for historians. PhD degrees were only introduced at British universities after 1917 in an explicit attempt to prevent American history students from going to Germany. The Manchester history department produced 18 PhDs between 1921 and 1930, of which 12 were women, something that made Manchester quite unique and might well have reflected

[46] Jakob Barnai, 'Eretz Israel – Filastin – The Holy Land: Main Dilemmas in Israeli Historiography', in: Frank and Hadler (eds), *Disputed Territories*, pp. 373–87; see also: David N. Myers, *Re-inventing the Jewish Past. European Intellectuals and the Zionist Return to History* (Oxford, 1995).

[47] Sonja Kmec, 'Luxembourg', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 140 f.

[48] John Kenyon, *The History Men: The Historical Profession in England since the Renaissance* (Pittsburg, PA, 1984), pp. 196 ff.

Tout's championing of women's education (he was also an active suffragist). Under Tout, George Unwin (1870–1925) and Frederick Maurice Powicke (1879–1963), the Manchester history department experienced its golden age, as it built up strong relations with the University of Oxford, in particular, whose graduates provided the great bulk of Manchester's postgraduate students.

But the kind of professionalisation championed here remained controversial. A.J.P. Taylor (1906–1990), who had a Manchester PhD, never used the title with his name and was widely known as 'Mr Taylor', and the renowned literary scholar F.R. Leavis, who had a Cambridge PhD (1924) was only referred to as 'Dr Leavis' when reviewers wished to ridicule his work.[49] Nevertheless, so powerful had the Manchester history school become after the Second World War that a young Hugh Trevor-Roper, later Regius Professor of History at Oxford, felt that its legacy of antiquarianism masquerading as professionalism had to be overcome:

> the Regius Chair of Modern History in this university [Oxford] has for thirty years been held by Medieval Manchester Mice. These men ... have gradually throttled and strangled the subject, reducing it to petty clerical antiquarianism, destitute of spirit, devoid of ideas, without range, without depth, without philosophy. Moreover, in these thirty years, they have sought to ensure that the unfortunate subject shall never revive, by the simple expedient of planting junior mice from their own mouse-nest in all other chairs both in this and in other universities. ... The mice are not in the least ashamed of their slender output, their narrow views, their utter obscurity. This, they say, is what Professors should be like.[50]

However, in the interwar period Britain still had to catch up with most of its continental rivals. New historical journals were founded in the interwar period. County record offices were reorganised on a more professional basis. The University of Oxford introduced a doctoral degree in 1917, although it hardly proved popular with the gentlemen attending this venerable institution until much later. The B.Litt. remained the standard research degree well into the 1960s. Overall, then, Britain can be seen as catching up with its continental European nation states in promoting a professionalised historiography that was capable of lending the liberal historical master narrative of the country greater weight. This was seen as necessary not just in the light of the debates surrounding war guilt but also because of the increasing onslaught in Europe on some of the key pillars on which liberal national master narratives rested.

[49] Stuart Jones and Chris Godden, 'Inventing the History PhD in the UK: Manchester in the Age of Powicke and Tout', unpublished paper given at the University of Manchester, 15 June 2011; see also: Michael Bentley, *Modernizing England's Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870–1970* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 204.
[50] Richard Davenport-Hines (ed.), *Letters from Oxford: Hugh Trevor-Roper to Bernard Berenson* (London, 2006), p. 220.

When George V opened the British parliament in 1935, his speech had been written by the historian George Trevelyan (1876–1962):

> it is to me a source of pride and thankfulness that the perfect harmony of our parliamentary system with our constitutional monarchy has survived the shocks that have in recent years destroyed other empires and other liberties ... The complex forms and balanced spirit of our Constitution were not the discovery of a single era, still less of a single party or of a single person. They are the slow accretion of centuries, the outcome of patience, tradition and experience constantly finding outlets .... for the impulse toward liberty, justice and social improvement inherent in our people down the ages.[51]

These sentences were a patriotic assertion of the Whig view of historiography that had associated constitutional liberties and democratic traditions with Englishness throughout the long nineteenth century. Such a decidedly Whiggish inflection of British national history remained strong in popular historical writing in interwar Britain, not just among liberals.

The conservative historian Arthur Bryant (1899–1985), for example, began writing a popular epic national history of England that was informed by the steadfast belief in the enduring, timeless and superior character of the English. Whilst his anti-pluralism and his strong monarchism sat awkwardly with Whig beliefs, he nevertheless insisted in every of his numerous publications to depict the English as being characterised by their liberty, their gentleness, love of countryside and homeliness. in essence he was providing a popular Conservative version of the Whig historiography.[52]

Herbert Butterfield (1900–1979) became famous for demolishing the theoretical underpinnings of Whiggism in the interwar period, but in practice, he could not free his own writing from a continued belief in a national history that followed a civilisational path towards greater liberty.[53] And Lewis Namier, for all his effective and iconoclastic anti-Whiggism, was nevertheless a life-long admirer of British political institutions, which he held in the highest regard. As Linda Colley (*1949) has written: 'For him [Namier], Britain was the epitome of constitutional wisdom and organic development, whereas Germany, Britain's counterpoise, was characterised by violence, chaos and ineptitude.'[54] And Treveiyan's sentences above, put into the mouth of the King, also betrayed an awareness that these institutions as well as allegedly British values and ideas were under threat elsewhere in Europe.

[51] Cited in J. M. Hernon Jr, 'The Last Whig Historian and Consensus History: George Maculay Treveiyan, 1876–1962', *American Historical Review* 81 (1976), p. 86.
[52] Julia Stapleton, *Sir Arthur Bryant and National History in Twentieth-Century Britain* (Lanham, MD, 2006).
[53] Michael Bentley, 'Butterfield at the Millenium', *Storia della Storiografia* 38 (2000), pp. 17–32. See also Michael Bentley, *The Life and Thought of Herbert Butterfield* (Cambridge, 2011).
[54] Linda Colley, *Lewis Namier* (London, 1989), p. 14 f. On Namier's iconoclastic anti-Whiggism see ibid., pp. 46 ff.

This was particularly the case with Weimar Germany, where liberal, democratic historians, willing to defend the republic against its many enemies, were at a premium. Most historians were outraged about the alleged injustice of the Versailles Peace Treaty and opposed to the 1918/19 democratic revolution as well as the parliamentary republic that emerged from it. In their historical writings, the majority of them remained state-oriented and championed the notion of a positive German *Sonderweg* or special path which set the country apart from the Western democracies. The most important methodological innovation in interwar German historiography was the turn to *Volksgeschichte*, which will be discussed at greater length below. Suffice it to say here that it had distinctly right-wing political connotations. The few liberal historians who were willing to endorse, or, at least, accept the republic, struggled to provide a national narrative that would legitimate that republic. Walter Goetz (1867–1958) was one of the few who called on fellow historians to leave behind the monarchist, Prussian nationalist perspective which, he argued, blinded German historians and made them unable to accept the political settlement of the post-First World War period.[55] They tried their best to invoke the memory of the 1848 revolution drawing a straight line between the Paulskirchen constitution and the Weimar constitution. It was again Goetz who reminded fellow historians that the continuity that had been drawn between the wars of liberation and the Bismarckian settlement of 1871 was not the only possible one. Instead the wars of liberty could equally be connected to 1848 and 1919.[56]

The revolution of 1918/19, however, remained deeply problematical. Arthur Rosenberg (1889–1943) was one of its first historians. A lapsed Communist, his history bemoaned the failure of the revolution to push Germany further towards socialism. He famously described it as a middle-class revolution won by the working classes.[57] Very few other historians in Germany took this line, or sought to defend the achievements of the revolution. Take, for example, Karl Alexander von Müller (1882–1964), in many respects a typical product of the national historical tradition in Germany: a German Rhodes scholar at the University of Oxford before 1914, his world view was characterised by a boundless admiration for Bismarck and support for German imperialism. The revolution was a complete shock to him and he never came to terms with the parliamentary republic emerging from it. As head of the Institut zur Erforschung des deutschen Volkstums im Süden und Südosten (Institute for Research into German Ethnic Minorities in South and South-Eastern Europe), he moved closer to völkisch ideas in the interwar period.[58] Another mainstream German historian, Georg

[55] Walter Goetz, *Historiker meiner Zeit* (Cologne, 1957), p. 419. The essay on German contemporary historiography was first published in 1924.
[56] Ibid., p. 421.
[57] Arthur Rosenberg, *The Birth of the German Republic* (New York, 1931).
[58] Matthias Berg, *Karl Alexander von Müller. Historiker für den Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen 2014).

von Below (1858–1927), readily dismissed the historical writings of 'democrats lacking scholarly profundity', and instead being committed to the 'cloud-cockooland of cosmopolitanism'.[59]

One of those democratic historians was Emil Ludwig (1881–1948) – much hated by the academic profession, not only because his books sold much better than those of professional historians, nor because he could write better than most, but because he was a democrat. His biography of Bismarck dared to criticise this icon of German national unity. His views on Wilhelm II, on whom he published a biography in 1925, were even harsher. He was a well-known pacifist and critic of Imperial Germany. During the revolution he had been a vociferous supporter of the Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany, USPD). By the time the National Socialists burnt his books, he was already a Swiss citizen. He had lived in his house at the Lago Maggiore for much of the period between 1919 and 1940. But the convinced republican had to leave Switzerland in 1940 after he had become the object of openly anti-Semitic campaigns in the Swiss press and the Swiss government had told him explicitly to tone down his criticisms of National Socialist Germany.[60]

A comparison of Germany with Hungary is instructive. As in Weimar Germany, the peace treaties at the end of the First World War produced a national outcry. As in Germany, the collapse of an empire resulted in a liberal and, immediately afterwards, a Communist revolution, which was ultimately defeated. A much more authoritarian political regime emerged in interwar Hungary, which broke with the liberal history cult surrounding the 1848 revolution that had been established before 1918.[61] Whereas in Germany, the events of 1848 never really fitted into the dominant storylines of national unification that came to be focused on Bismarck and the 'wars of unification' between 1864 and 1871, in Hungary historians had successfully integrated 1848 into the official national history, albeit a sanitised version of 1848 that excluded its more radical political aspects. It helped that Hungarian historians could portray 1848 as a moment of national defence against a hostile foreign power, i.e. Russia, whereas German historians found it much more difficult to do so. In the interwar period the Hungarian state generously financed historical studies that had the aim of demonstrating how historically unjustified the Treaty of Trianon was. The comparative history of Hungary with its newly sovereign neighbouring states became popular, precisely because such comparison showed these states' lack of historical legitimacy. Hungarian comparative history was thus born out of the spirit of historiographical nationalism in the service of the revision of the much-hated Treaty of Trianon, which had

[59] Georg von Below, *Die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung von den Befreiungskriegen bis zu unseren Tagen*, 2nd revised edition (Munich, 1924), pp. 42 and 29.
[60] Sebastian Ulrich, '"Der Fesselndste unter den Biographen ist heute nicht der Historiker". Emil Ludwig und seine historischen Biographien', in: Hardtwig and Schütz (eds), *Geschichte für Leser*, pp. 35–56.
[61] Árpád von Klimó, *Nation, Konfession, Geschichte* (Munich, 2003), pp. 55 ff.

reduced Hungary to under one-third of its pre-war territory (it lost 72 per cent of its territory to neighbouring states).[62]

In Hungary, one of the few critics of methodological nationalism was Oscar Jászi (1875–1957), who perceived such nationalism as a stumbling block to maintaining a multi-ethnic and democratic Hungary. Jászi has been described as a daring pathfinder of modern democracy in Hungary. A champion of federation under the old Austro-Hungarian empire, he had developed friendly contacts with representatives of all the different national movements, and both before and after 1918 insisted on Hungary only being able to develop into a happy nation if it accepted the rights of other nationalities. He identified genuine patriotism with the Hungarian Reform movement that had sought to champion social and political reform in the middle of the nineteenth century, and denounced the more ethnically based nationalism that rose to dominance in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Sadly his was to be an increasingly lone voice in the 1920s, as the Horthy regime came to employ heavy doses of nationalism in its attempt to prop up an increasingly authoritarian political regime. After 1925 it was a voice that spoke from the USA rather than from Hungary itself.[63]

In many of the new nation states of East-Central Europe, historians who participated in projects to establish liberal democratic national master narratives battled against the odds. Many intellectuals, including historians, were attracted to the construction of national essences, which in turn contributed to the radicalisation of nationalism. In Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, the discourse on national characterology paved the way for historical interpretations that undermined liberal democratic thought and instead endorsed more radical ideologies.[64] In Poland the national(ist) perspective became vital for justifying the rebirth of the Polish nation at the end of the First World War. Hence, some of the key debates in interwar Poland took place between those historians, who justified a Jagellonian view on national history, taking the imperial history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as benchmark for national history, whilst others warned against imperial overstretch and instead preferred to consolidate Poland around the national-democratic state that had been created in 1919. The Western allies had indicated to the Polish elites early on in the conflict that their support on the side of the Allies was likely to be rewarded with the reconstitution of the Polish nation state. In response, historians such as Oskar Halecki (1891–1973), eulogised the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Polish delegation made him an expert at the Versailles Peace Conference, where he spent most of his time arguing in favour of Poland's historical rights over Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.[65] Subsequently Halecki became a close political adviser to Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), who wanted to steer Poland to great-power status in an increasingly authoritarian and étatist manner.

[62] Thomas Szerecz is preparing a PhD dissertation at Central European University in Budapest on this fascinating subject. It is provisionally entitled 'Comparative Historians in Hungary between the Neo-Conservative and Communist Eras'. I am grateful to him for alerting me to this intriguing connection between comparative history and methodological nationalism in Hungary.

[63] György Litván, *A Twentieth-Century Prophet: Oscar Jászi* (Budapest, 2006).

[64] Balázs Trencsényi, *The Politics of 'National Character'. A Study in Interwar East European Thought* (London, 2011).

In Czechoslovakia, the interwar national master narrative was dominated by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk's (1850–1937) identification of Czech national history with the progress of humanity. The Reformation played a key role in the constitution of the Czech nation, which he saw as a precursor of the nineteenth century national movement that found its culmination in the foundation of the Czechoslovak state after the First World War. National history, for Masaryk and his followers, was an important resource for justifying the newly founded nation state. However, unlike many of the other new-found states of East-Central and Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovak national master narrative was one that coexisted harmoniously with notions of liberal democracy. Masaryk was, after all, a champion of the European Enlightenment, an admirer of both French republicanism and Anglo-Saxon constitutionalism and liberalism. He provided a liberal-democratic framework for the national state which was not without its prominent critics. Thus, for example, the group of historians around Jaroslav Goll (1846–1929) (the so-called Goll school), in particular Josef Pekař (1870–1937), upheld the supranational idea of the Habsburg empire. They had been sceptical of endorsing calls for Czech and Slovak independence during the First World War, and they kept their distance from the history politics of the Czechoslovak state after 1919. Pekař, in particular, criticised what he saw as the repression of the German minority and the functionalist abuse of history for nation-building purposes.[66]

If liberal national master narratives struggled to establish themselves in Germany , Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Central and East-Central Europe, and if many of these states subsequently succumbed to the lure of right-wing authoritarian regimes, what about that bulwark of the nineteenth century liberal tradition in historiography, France? Historians associated with the *Annales* in the interwar period upheld the commitment of French historians to the values of the French revolution. In so far as they wrote national history, they tended to do so within a cosmopolitan and non-ethnic orientation. Pirenne, discussed above, was admired by Marc Bloch (1886–1944) and Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) for his methodological innovations and perceived by them as an ally in their quest to renew historical writing. They championed a greater opening to neighbouring disciplines, including geography, anthropology and sociology, and,

[65] Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, 'Zwischen imperialer Geschichte und Ostmitteleuropa als Geschichtsregion: Oskar Halecki und die polnische "Jagellonische Idee"', in: Frank Hadler and Mathias Mesenhöller (eds), *Lost Greatness and Past Oppression in East Central Europe: Representations of the Imperial Experience in Historiography since 1918* (Leipzig, 2007), pp. 104–7.

[66] Jiří Kořalka, 'Czechoslovakia', *American Historical Review*, 97:4 (1992), 1026–40, 1027; Milan Řepa, 'The Czechs, Germans and Sudetenland: Historiographical Disputes in the "Heart of Europe"', in: Frank and Hadler (eds), *Disputed Territories*, pp. 303–28; Marie A. Neudorfl, 'Czech History, Modern Nation Building and Tomas G. Masaryk (1850–1937)', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 20 (1993), pp. 13–20.

above all, they took up Pirenne's rallying call for more comparative history.[67] The comparative method, they argued, was the surest defence against methodological nationalism. Of course, there had also been German champions of comparative history well before 1914 – one only needs to think of Hintze or Breysig's Institut für vergleichende Geschichte Europas (institute for Comparative European History) in Berlin. Nevertheless, after the First World War, the Germans served no longer as transnational models of how to write history. Their mantle was picked up by French historians, who were to play a leading role in the development of the subject area well into the 1950s. The founding fathers of the *Annales*, in close collaboration with Pirenne, by breaking decisively with the traditions of German historism, contributed more than most to the pluralisation of perspectives and methods of history writing in the interwar period.[68] Both Bloch and Febvre were located at the University of Strasbourg for a while in the interwar period, where they were very much aware of the German traditions, and their new journal, *Annales* (*Annals*), was conceptualised as a rival to the German *Vierteljahresschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte* (*Economic and Social History Quarterly*). Pirenne's support for his younger colleagues was to a considerable degree rooted in their mutual desire to counter the German influence on history writing. Hence, not in their writing of national history, but in their conception of how to write history tout court, there was more than a hint of methodological nationalism in the early *Annales* project.

In other well-established republican states, such as Switzerland, the defence of liberal traditions also came to the fore in the interwar period. The nationalist appropriations of the medieval past of the Old Confederacy reached its high-point in and around the Second World War, when homeland defence against Nazi Germany became a key issue. It was depicted in terms of the defence of the ancient neutrality and freedoms of the Swiss. But as early as the 1920s Swiss history politics had combined notions of the Alps as protector of the sources of major European rivers with ideas of Switzerland as home for the new League of Nations, a new international organisation for conflict resolution, first suggested by the American President Woodrow Wilson in 1918 and eventually established in post-war Geneva, that would bring peace, liberty and democracy to the world. It was Switzerland's historical mission to facilitate the harmonious living together of the European peoples. Freedom, justice, and federalism became the hallmarks of a Switzerland that had to be defended against all foreign and home-born threats, for there were certainly signs in the 1930s that Swissness and anti-Semitism and Swissness and right-wing authoritarianism would also fit together. Even the history

[67] Henri Pirenne, 'De la méthode comparative en histoire', *Compte rendu du Ve Congrès international des sciences historiques* (Bruxelles 1923), pp. 17–32; Marc Bloch, 'Pour une histoire comparée des sociétés européennes', *Revue de synthèse historique* 46 (1928), pp. 15–50.

[68] On the intriguing foundational history of the *Annales*, see John L. Harvey, 'An American *Annales*? The AHA and the *Revue internationale d'histoire économique* of Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch', *Journal of Modern History* 76:3 (2004), pp. 578–621.

culture of one of the oldest republics in Europe was not completely protected from the anti-democratic onslaught of the interwar years.[69]

The ICHS, which continued to organise the world historical congresses in the interwar period,[70] struggled to maintain the liberal tradition against the advances of authoritarian right-wing, Fascist and Communist attempts to dislodge it. None other than Pirenne headed the organising committee of the 1923 congress in Brussels, the first one to take place after 1913 and the interruption of academic internationalism by the war years. Pirenne was keen to present his native Belgium as an open and cosmopolitan nation and at the same time encourage a refutation of methodological nationalism and ethnically informed national histories among other historians. He had famously set his mind against readmitting the German historians to the world historical congress in 1923, not only because he could not yet forgive their wartime nationalism, but also because he regarded their presence as a danger to his project of de-ethnicising national histories. Belgium as the crossroads of cultures, Pirenne argued, was to lead the way in an international examination of the methodological groundrules of historical writing.[71] However, at the same time as Pirenne was promoting his native country as a cosmopolitan microcosm, he was faced with the rise of an ethnically rooted Flemish nationalism. Flemish historians regarded Belgian history à la Pirenne as an invention of early-nineteenth-century French diplomats, and provided their own Flemish master narrative. The universities of Ghent and Leuven became bilingual in the interwar period. An Archief en Museum voor het Vlaamse Cultuurleven (Archive and Museum of Flemish Cultural Life) was established in Antwerp in 1936. If the Flemish movement had not been tainted by its collaboration with the German occupiers during the First World War, Flemish historical master narratives might have been even more influential in the interwar period.

Pirenne's hopes, both for his native Belgium and for the international community of historians remained largely unfulfilled. The history of the ICHS in the interwar period was, to a considerable extent, the history of the nationalist reassertion of history through and in the transnational arena. The ICHS, at its 1928 Oslo congress, affirmed the national principles in its modes of representation, which meant that it accepted delegations from the Communist Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, and, later on, from National Socialist Germany and Francoist Spain as national delegations, whilst it refused officially to acknowledge the exile historiographies from all these countries. It was a victory for the Communist and Fascist dictatorships within the ICHS that they now alone represented their respective national historiographies in front of the world community of historians. And they

[69] For details see Guy P. Marchal, *Schweizer Gebrauchsgeschichte. Geschichtsbilder, Mythenbildung und nationale Identität* (Basel, 2006).

[70] For the pre-war congresses, see above, p. 211f.

[71] J. Tollebeek, 'A Diversity of Experiences. Belgian and Dutch Historians in Rome', in: H. Cools, M. Espadas Burgos, M. Gras, M. Matheus and M. Migilo (eds), *La storiografia tra passato e futuro. Il X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche (Roma 1955) cinquant'anni dopo* (Rome 2008), p. 249.

were not shy in pushing their particular ideological history politics onto the world historical congresses. So, for example, German historians were able to peddle the agenda of a racist *Volksgeschichte* in the service of a comprehensive revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty quite successfully in the 1930s.[72]

1938 was to be the last congress of the ICHS before the Second World War. It was held in Zurich, where the leadership of the ICHS, under Harold Temperley (1879–1939, as president), and Hans Nabholz (1874–1961, as treasurer) helplessly and haplessly stressed the organisation's enduring commitment to the values of scholarliness and freedom in the light of Communist, fascist and right-wing authoritarian regimes purging the historical profession of their respective countries of historians who were unwilling to toe the official line. And those historians willing to lend their pens to these regimes demonstrated in Zurich the extent to which history was in the service of totalitarianism. Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) spoke of the importance of the national principle in history which fully came into its own through struggle and death. German historians present celebrated the racial paradigm in historical thinking. Zurich certainly was to provide manifold examples for Iorga's famous statement that 'one turns somewhat barbaric once one is nationalizing'.[73] When hypernationalist fervour threw Europe again into the clutches of war in 1939, historiographical internationalism was not to resurface until 1950.

Yet, despite the hypernationalism, that was engulfing parts of European historiography in the 1930s, it should be noted that the interwar period saw the emergence of a considerable body of world history. Informed by a sense of an impending threat to European civilisation in the aftermath of the First World War and the Russian revolution, a range of historians from Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), Arnold Toynbee (1889–1975), José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) and H.G. Wells (1866–1946) to Geoffrey Dawson (1874–1944), Henri Berr (1863–1954) and Cesare Cantú (1804–1895) reviewed the history of mankind from the ancient high civilisations to the contemporary world. They mostly adopted the tried and tested narrative scheme, according to which they traced the rise and fall of civilisations in various parts of the world. And many of them sought to present world history as the linear rise from the ancient civilisations to the contemporary Western world which was presented as the latest successor to the civilisational mantle of world history. Distinctions which juxtaposed 'primitive peoples' and 'cultured peoples' certainly could be found frequently in world histories published in the interwar period.[74]

[72] John L. Harvey, 'The Common Adventure of Mankind. Academic internationalism and Western Historical Practice from Versailles to Potsdam', Ph.D. thesis Pennsylvania State University 2003, chapter 6.

[73] Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Toward a Global Community: the International Historical Congresses and the International Committee of Historical Science, 1898–2000* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 162–79; Iorga is quoted on p. 173.

[74] Benedikt Stuchtey and Eckhardt Fuchs (eds), *Writing World History 1800–2000* (Oxford, 2003); Jerry H. Bentley, *Shapes of World History in Twentieth-Century Scholarship* (Washington, DC, 2003); Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (New York, 2003); Paul Costello, *World Historians and their Goals. Twentieth-Century Answers to Modernism* (DeKalb, IL, 1993).

Transnational histories were sometimes written out of the desire to overcome historiographic nationalism. Toynbee, for example, changed his views on nationalism as result of the First World War. Before 1914 he applauded the liberal national liberation movements in various parts of Eastern Europe and at the peace conference in 1919 he still was an advocate of the principle of national self-determination. However, thereafter he increasingly came to abhor the ugly and destructive side of nationalism, which he saw as responsible for endless acts of violent and brutal barbarism. His *Study of History*, started in the 1920s, was motivated by the desire to write against the impending disasters that nationalism was about to produce, though even Toynbee could probably not have imagined the intensity with which hypernationalism was to wreak havoc on a global scale during the Second World War.[75]

However, not all global or universal histories were necessarily seeking to overcome national prejudices in historical writing. They were equally put into the service of national histories. In East-Central Europe, for example, a range of historians battled to write European history that would draw the line between East-central and Eastern Europe, with the latter being excluded from Europe, be it on account of the Orthodox religion or of an alleged general state of barbarity. In Hungary, Gyula Szekfű (1883–1955), and Sándor Domanovszky (1877–1955), among others, claimed that Hungary was the defender of the West against the barbaric onslaughts of the East. In very different ways, Josef Pekař (1870–1937) and Václav Chaloupecký (1882–1951) of the new Czechoslovakia were trying to connect Czech history with aspects of the Western tradition.[76]

The Continued Prominence of Religion in National Histories

If liberal national historiographies were embattled in many parts of interwar Europe, the continuing conflict between religious and liberal national master narratives in many European states exacerbated the feeling of liberal national narratives being under threat. Strong links between Catholic nationalism and national history were characteristic of the Irish Free State after 1922. It can be traced back to the foundation of the National University of Ireland in 1908. At University College Dublin (UCD), the first professors of Irish history, Eoin Mac Neill (1867–1945) and Mary Hayden (1862–1942), were both active in the nationalist movement. Their colleague, John Marcus O'Sullivan (1891–1948), in fact became the Minister for Education in the first government of the Irish Free State in 1922. At University College Cork (UCC) and University College Galway (UCG), the history departments were also dominated by historians, such as Mary Donovan O'Sullivan (1887–1966) and James Hogan (1898–1963), who had well-known nationalist inclinations. As all appointments at the National University of Ireland (of which Galway and Cork were constituent parts) had to be informally approved by the

[75] William H. McNeill, *Arnold Joseph Toynbee, 1889–1975* (Oxford, 1978), p. 448 ff.

[76] I am grateful to Tibor Frank for providing me with the examples from Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Catholic hierarchy, the historians' nationalist sympathies cannot be surprising, but even at the Protestant Trinity College, the incumbent of the Erasmus Smith Chair in Modern History in 1914 was Edmund Curtis (1881–1943), who shared the Catholic nationalist sympathies of his fellow Irish history professors.[77]

In Spain, the re-Catholicisation of Spanish national historical consciousness under Franco saw new attempts to write national history in a Catholic key, which found expression in the routine idealisation of medieval Christendom, the stress on the moral purity of Spanish Catholic nationality, and the strong role of Opus Dei in history departments and historical education more generally. The nation became synonymous with the church and the monarchy. One of the foundational texts of the new Catholic master narrative was Julián Juderías' (1877–1918) *La Leyenda Negra* (*The Black Legend*), first published in 1914. It countered the liberal idea that Catholicism was a dark (black) influence in Spanish national history throughout the ages and lamented the absence of a Catholic master narrative that was capable of defending 'the Catholic conception of life' underlying the Spanish national character and its idealism. The liberals, Juderías argued, had invented the black legend of Spanish national history in order to put the nation down. What was needed, instead, was the celebration of Spain's moral superiority that found expression, above all, in Cervantes' novel *Don Quijote*. Pedro Salnz Rodríguez (1897–1986), in his lectures at the University of Madrid in 1924/25 argued that Spanish decadence was rooted in the abandonment of the Catholic ideals that had produced the Golden Age of Spain. National Catholic historical writing celebrated 'mother Spain', and produced a cult of ancestry that was to inspire uncritical love for the 'genius' of the Spanish 'race'. In its imperial inflection national Catholicism came to celebrate *hispanidad* as the principle affirming the spiritual community of all Hispanic nations. The Primo de Rivera and Franco dictatorships, which built on such re-Catholicisation of the Spanish historical master narrative, thus marked a decisive break with the strong nineteenth-century liberal tradition of historical writing.[78]

In Germany, the historian of the Catholic Centre Party, Carl Bachem (1858–1945) described political Catholicism as an expression of the German national character, thereby combining a national with a party political perspective.[79] He explicitly put himself in the tradition of a historiography legitimating particular political viewpoints, and cited Treitschke, Droysen and Sybel as his models, i.e. precisely the Protestant Prussian historians who had done so much to exclude Catholicism from German history. According to Bachem, it was time to reassert the Catholic narrative of Germany:

> We have no reason at all to forget that Catholicism had been at home on German soil a thousand years before the advent of Protestantism, that once all

[77] Mary O'Dowd, 'Ireland', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 172.
[78] Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria. Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975* (Princeton, NJ, 1997), chapter 6.
[79] Rolf Kiefer, *Karl Bachem 1858–1945. Politiker und Historiker des Zentrums* (Mainz, 1989), pp. 197 ff.

> of Germany was Catholic and united under Catholic emperors, and that the great schism that the coming of Protestantism meant for religious unity was the biggest national misfortune ever to befall the German people. We will never concede that the German spirit is identitcal with the Protestant one, that only this can be truly German what has arisen from Protestant spiritual legacies. If one can talk about the rights of primogeniture on German soil, then German Catholicism has the best claim to this right.[80]

Catholic historians had been regarded very much as outsiders by a Protestant-dominated profession in the nineteenth century, which did not hinder German Catholic historians from constructing their own historical master narrative of Germany which differed sharply from the Protestant mainstream version in many respects.[81] Some Catholic historians, notably Schnabel, developed their concept of national history largely in line with the new parliamentary and democratic state of Weimar. After all, the Catholic Centre Party was one of the key democratic parties in the Weimar Republic. It is therefore only logical that Schnabel was not allowed to publish the remaining volumes of his *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert* (*German History in the Nineteenth Century*) under National Socialism. They had to wait until after 1945 before they could appear. On the other hand, however, some of the key ideas of Catholic historiography, notably an attachment to notions of a German Reich that was traced back to the medieval Catholic emperors, made Catholic historians susceptible to National Socialism and its propagation of a Third Reich. Within the Catholic milieu of Weimar Germany, anti-pluralism was as strong as the yearning for a more estates-based society. Hence, some Catholic historians did not find it too difficult to cooperate with the National Socialists and even saw the National Socialist take-over in history as a means of overcoming the Catholic isolation and marginalisation in German historical sciences.[82]

In Hungary, the authoritarian regime of regent Admiral Miklós Horthy (1868–1957) encouraged a history writing that espoused the Christian-national ideal and promoted the cult of St Stephen.[83] Before 1918 the cult was upheld by the Habsburgs, who used it to legitimate the idea of Hungary as *Regnum Marianum*. After 1918 the cult was put into the service of right-wing Hungarian nationalism. The cult of the Catholic king, celebrated widely as founder of the Hungarian state, served the Horthy regime well in a number of ways: first, it justified the regime's anti-liberalism and anti-socialism; secondly, it provided a religious legitimation of

[80] Karl Bachem, *Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der Deutschen Zentrumspartei*, 9 vols (Cologne, 1927–1932), vol. 8, p. 488.
[81] See p. 198f.
[82] Oded Heilbronner, 'The Place of Catholic Historians and Catholic Historiography in Nazi Germany', *History* 88 (2003), pp. 280–92.
[83] Árpád von Klimó, 'Die gespaltene Vergangenheit: die grossen christlichen Kirchen im Kampf um die Nationalgeschichte Ungarns, 1920–1948', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 47 (1999), pp. 871–94; idem, 'St. Stephen's Day: Politics and Religion in Twentieth-Century Hungary', *East Central Europe* 26 (1999), pp. 15–29.

the hierarchical social order of Hungary; thirdly it underlined the close relationship between church and state (after all, St Stephen allegedly was sent a crown by the Pope); and, fourthly, it could be used to call for the revision of the peace treaty of Trianon which, for Hungary, had meant the loss of two-thirds of its pre-war territory. Hungarian historians justified their country's post-war territorial ambitions via the 'idea of the holy crown of St Stephen', a nineteenth-century legal concept about the integrity of the lands of the Hungarian crown within the Habsburg monarchy. The Horthy regime generously supported the annual St Stephen's procession after 1920. The Admiral himself marched ahead of the procession (despite being a Calvinist) every 20 August, and the military participated prominently in the festivities, leading to a militarisation of the religious cult in the interwar period. On the occasion of the 900th anniversary of the death of St Stephen in 1938, the Catholic Eucharist congress was held in Budapest and around 800,000 people participated in the procession. The mayor of Budapest, Ferenc Ripka, even commissioned a historical study in 1927 which sought to prove once and for all that the annual St Stephen's procession was not an invented tradition as was claimed by Protestants and socialists. This appeal to historical truth demonstrates that the Catholic historical national master narrative was not uncontested in the interwar period. Although the Catholic church undertook sustained propaganda campaigns on behalf of St Stephen, Communists, socialists, liberals and Protestants remained hostile or at least sceptical. They rooted an alternative idea of Hungary in the historical legacy of 1848 and the Protestant reformation, arguing that the Hungarian people had fought continuously for liberty. Although large segments of the Protestant churches were staunchly nationalist in the interwar period, they still felt the need to protect the legacy of St Stephen from both the atheist left and the partisan Catholic church. Relations between both major Christian denominations in Hungary remained characterised by mutual distrust, and each continued to underwrite quite different historical national master narratives. In the context of the Second World War, the cult of St Stephen was used very widely to justify Hungary's war effort against the atheist Soviet Union. Throughout the ages, historians emphasised, Hungary had been a bulwark against the dangers emanating from the east.

In the Communist Soviet Union, the strong adherence of Ukrainian national history to Ukrainian church history had its roots in the provision of a history for the nation that would act as a response to attempts to subordinate Ukrainian national history to Soviet Russian history. The Ukrainian Theological Scientific Society in L'vov (today's L'viv) published its own journal entitled *Bohoslov'ja* (Theology) between 1923 and 1939. It also took responsibility for the *Pratis Bohoslovs'ko-Naukovoho Tovarystva* (The Works of the Theological-Scientific Society) and edited the works of the Basilian Fathers, *Zypysky Chynu Sv. Vasyliya Velykoho* (Proceedings of the Order of Saint Basil the Great) between 1924 and 1939. Ultimately, the totalitarian Soviet state was to prevail over these efforts until the breakdown of communism in the early 1990s. If the influence of Catholicism on the historical national master narratives in Ireland, Spain, Germany and Hungary made life difficult for a liberal understanding of the nation, we can see Ukrainian church history as a defence of Ukrainian nationality against the totalitarian claims of Soviet history. However, we cannot say that it was fostering a liberal understanding of national history against the officially prescribed Communist master narrative. [84]

National History and Right-Wing Dictatorships / Fascism

Right-wing authoritarian and fascist regimes in Europe often sought to harness the power of religion for their own national master narratives, and generally they were keen to instrumentalise history writing for their politics. Thus, for example, in Germany, National Socialist historians promoted the idea that German national consciousness could be traced all the way back to the ninth century.[85] The most committed of National Socialist historians, such as Walter Frank (1905–1945), at the Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschland (National Institute for the History of the New Germany), sought to infuse German national history with the racial paradigms championed by the regime.[86] More mainstream historiography retained its distance from such racialisation of historical writing, but conservative étatist historians supported aspects of the regime's policy and were enamoured by its foreign policy successes. Many were willing to promote the regime and its aims in diverse contexts.[87] Certainly, very few German historians protested at the removal of their Jewish or democratic colleagues from their university positions, and hardly any of them resisted National Socialism. Müller, who, at the behest of the regime and the journal's publisher, Oldenbourg, replaced Meinecke as editor of *Historische Zeitschrift* (*Historical Journal*) in 1935, wrote one year later that 'the historical discipline does not come empty-handed to the new German state and its youth.'[88]

In the context of the Second World War, a number of historians directly collaborated with the National Socialist regime in the attempt to legitimate the territorial expansion of the German nation both westwards and eastwards. So-called *Westforschung*, under historians such as Franz Petri (1903–1993), justified the inclusion of parts of France and the Low Countries into Germany, whilst *Ostforschung*, under historians such as Werner Conze (1910–1986), Theodor Schieder (1908–1984) and Herman Aubin (1885–1969), worked out plans which

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[84] Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (eds), *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography* (Budapest, 2009).

[85] Wolfgang Hessler, 'Die Anfänge des deutschen Nationalgefühls in der ostfränkischen Geschichtsschreibung des 9. Jahrhunderts' (PhD thesis, Halle, Berlin, 1943).

[86] Helmut Heiber, *Walter Frank und sein Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschland* (Stuttgart, 1966).

[87] Karen Schönwälder, '"Taking Their Place in the Front-Line"(?): German Historians during Nazism and War', *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte*, 25 (1996), 205–19, 211. Also Felix Gilbert, 'German Historiography during the Second World War: A bibliographical Survey', *American Historical Review* 53:1 (1947), 50–58, 51.

[88] Cited in Winfried Schulze, 'German Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s', in: Hartmut Lehmann and James van Horn Melton (eds), *Paths of Continuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 27.

foresaw the ethnic cleansing of wide parts of Eastern Europe of its Slav population and the resettlement of those territories with ethnic Germans. Historians thus belonged to those intellectuals who Susanne Heim (*1955) and Götz Aly (*1947) have called 'Intellectuals preparing the road to annihilation' (*Vordenker der Vernichtung*).[89]

The rethinking of the territorial shape of Germany was intimately connected to the rise of *Volksgeschichte* after the end of the First World War. *Volksgeschichte* sought to break with the almost exclusive state orientation of German pre-war historiography, and instead develop an interest in ethnicity as the new guiding light of historical work. Developing interdisciplinary interests (in particular with sociology, geography, and statistics), historians practising Volksgeschichte traced the settlement history of Germany in Europe in order to support claims to wide areas of Eastern, Central and Western Europe. They began to argue that Germans had a historical civilising mission in Eastern Europe, which implied that much of Eastern Europe was German *Kulturboden* (cultural soil), even if Germans only formed a small minority of the actual population in those areas. Universities in the border regions of interwar Germany, such as the University of Königsberg, became prominent in fostering such historical research. in Königsberg, Hans Rothfels (1891–1976), who later, somewhat ironically, had to leave Germany due to his Jewish forefathers, promoted *Volksgeschichte* among a younger cohort of historians.[90]

In Fascist Italy, ideologues of the regime spread the imperialist-ethnic political concept of the nation through publications such as the *Rivista Storica Italiana* (*Review of Italian History*). After 1932, the regime ensured that all historical journals had chief editors who were in broad sympathy with Fascism.[91] As in National Socialist Germany, few out-and-out apologists for Fascism could be found among Italy's professional historians. Gentile, the historian of the Fascist movement, perhaps comes closest to the role played by Frank in Germany. Gentile's *Risorgimento e Fascismo* (*Risorgimento and Fascism*), published in 1931, celebrated Fascism as

[89] Susanne Heim and Götz Aly, *Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine neue europäische Ordnung* (Hamburg, 1991); see also Karen Schönwälder, *Historiker und Politik. Geschichtswissenschaft im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt/Main, 1992); Burkhard Dietz, Helmut Gabel and Ulrich Tiedau (eds), *Griff nach dem Westen. Die 'Westforschung' der völkisch-nationalen Wissenschaften zum nordwesteuropäischen Raum, 1919–1960* (Münster, 2003); Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch (eds), *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing 1919–1945* (Oxford, 2005); Christoph Nonn, *Theodor Schieder. Ein bürgerlicher Historiker im 20. Jahrhundert* (Düsseldorf 2013).

[90] Peter Lambert, 'German Historians and Nazi Ideology. The Parameters of the *Volksgemeinschaft* and the Problem of Historical Legitimation, 1930–1945', *European History Quarterly* 25 (1995), pp. 555–82; Peter Schöttler (ed.), *Geschichtsschreibung als Legitimationswissenschaft 1918–1945* (Frankfurt/Main, 1997); Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds), *Deutsche Historiker im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt/Main, 2000).

[91] Edoardo Tortarolo, 'Die *Rivista Storica Italiana* 1884–1929', in: Matthias Middell (ed.), *Historische Zeitschriften im internationalen Vergleich* (Leipzig, 1999), pp. 83–92. Claudio Fogu, *The Historic Imaginary. Politics of History in Fascist Italy* (Toronto, 2003), p. 24.

fulfilment of the national ideals that had enthused Italians during the Risorgimento. Liberty, Gentile argued, was not the liberty of the individual, but the liberty of the Fascist state. If few went as far as Gentile in identifying the making of the Italian nation with Fascism, many, including Gioacchino Volpe (1876–1971), were happy enough to cooperate with the regime, endorse it when necessary, and benefit from it in terms of resources and advancement. Volpe's national history, *L'Italia in cammino* (*Italy on the Move*, 1927), identified Fascism with the project of completing national unity that had started with the Risorgimento. However, Volpe, much more than Gentile, insisted on the achievements in nation-state building of the liberal Italian state preceding Fascism.[92]

One of the strongest critics of Fascist Italy, Croce, continued to live in the country throughout Fascism and even managed to publish his national history, *Storia d'Italia dal 1871 al 1915* (*History of Italy from 1871 to 1915*, 1928). Here, he upheld the nineteenth-century view of liberty against its enemies from the right and the left. Celebrating the achievements of liberalism, he depicted the victory of Fascism as a complete break with the legacy of the Risorgimento. His outspoken opposition to the regime would have been unthinkable in National Socialist Germany. Delio Cantimori (1904–1966), a professor at the Scuola Normale in Pisa during the 1930s, was another Italian historian, who was openly critical of Fascism. He had shown Fascist sympathies in the 1920s, admiring the movement's mobilising potential, which, he thought, promised to bridge the gap between the Italian elites and the masses. But his attraction to what he believed to be a heady mixture of conservatism and revolution gave way to commitment to proletarian revolution and communism in the 1930s, before he withdrew from politics and political engagement altogether after 1956.[93] Many left of centre Italian historians, notably Salvemini and the brothers Rosselli, mentioned above, went into exile, where they contributed to the anti-fascist struggle.

The right-wing authoritarian dictatorships that were established in the Iberian peninsula in the interwar period also sought to harness the power of history to legitimate their political regimes. Both the military dictatorship (1926–33) and the *Estado Novo* (1933–74) in Portugal adopted a markedly conservative and exclusive nationalism that relied on the promotion of a traditionalist vision of the nation's past. Celebrating the golden age of Portuguese national history in the Age of Discoveries, it removed the advances of nineteenth-century liberalism and socialism and their democratic aspirations from the history books. Every year it celebrated the founding of the nation in 1140. In 1940 the 800th anniversary coincided with the 300th anniversary of the restoration of independence from Spain, and the celebrations on this occasion marked a high point of attempts to mobilise nationalist historical consciousness in support of the regime. The right-wing

[92] Martin Clark, 'Gioacchino Volpe and Fascist Historiography in Italy', in: Berger, Donovan and Passmore (eds), *Writing National History*, pp. 189–201.

[93] Pablo Fernando Rizi, *Benedetto Croce and Italian Fascism* (Toronto, 2003); Patricia Chiantera-Stutte, 'From Philosophy of History, from Fascism to Communism: a Conversion in Times of Transition', *Storia della Storiografia* 53 (2008), pp. 111–29.

Salazar dictatorship promoted in particular the Kings Alfonso Henriques and Joao IV as key national heroes, alongside 'discoverers', such as Henry the Navigator. The Academia Portuguesa da História (Portuguese Academy of History), refounded by the Estado Novo in 1936, provided the most important institutional backbone for such heroic national history. It could build on the monarchist and conservative school of historical writing that had revelled in the glories of days gone by since the nineteenth century. Its main rival, the Republican school, took a more critical, pessimist view of Portuguese national history and argued that the only remedy to the nineteenth-century decline of Portugal was republicanism. It was repressed by the Salazar regime. Whilst any oppositional views to the state-sanctioned conservative national history had to battle with censorship, the regime did not silence dissenting voices altogether, so that remnants of liberal and even Marxist influences could be found in historical works discussing Portugal's decline and 'economic backwardness' as well as the role of the people, of revolution and cultural transformation in modern and contemporary Portuguese history.[94]

Across the border, in Spain, history was still a subject that, by the 1930s, was not yet fully established at the universities. History departments tended to be small and insignificant. The civil war between 1936 and 1939 led to a mass exodus of Republican intellectuals, among them eminent historians and intellectuals such as Rafael Altamira (1866–1951), Pere Bosch Gimpera (1891–1974), Claudio Sánchez Albornoz (1893–1984), and Américo Castro (1885–1972). The regime purged the universities of all those whom it deemed disloyal to Francoism; overall, around one-third of all university professors lost their jobs. Francoist history politics favoured variants of Catholic and authoritarian Spanish nationalism in history writing. The Ministry of Education established a new scientific structure around the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientfficas (CSIC, National Research Council) in 1939. Within this institution, the representatives of the Falange and Opus Dei soon struggled over control and power. In terms of resources and advancement, historians were increasingly dependent on the goodwill of the historical section of the Consejo. It set up various historical institutes for diverse subfields of history and published a range of books and journals, including *Hispania. Revista Española de Historia* (*Hispania. Spanish Review of History*), founded in 1940. The Francoist regime backed the CSIC, because it hoped that ideological control of historical writing would be easier under one centralised institution, especially as history departments at the universities remained quite weak. Established at only nine of twelve Spanish universities, they had few students and by, 1955, only 77 chairs between them.

[94] Sérgio Campos Matos and Joana Gaspar de Freitas, 'Portugal', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 124 f.; see also: J. Amado Mendes, 'Portugal', in Karl Pellens, Siegfried Quandt, Hans Süssmuth (eds) *Historical Culture – Historical Communication. International Bibliography* (Frankfurt/Main, 1994), pp. 307–21.

Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo (1856–1912) was perhaps the most well-known apologist for Francoism among the Spanish historians.[95]

The strength of the ethnic nationalist paradigm in interwar historical writing can also be observed in the newly created state of Yugoslavia – founded as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 and renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. It embarked on a process of federalisation which was not entirely unsuccessful. However, the state found it difficult to promote Yugoslavism in historical writing and overcome the strong ethnic orientation of national histories in the Balkans. A Yugoslav historical assocation was founded, which published its own journal of Yugoslav history. Vladimir Ćorović's (1885–1941) *Istorija Jugoslavije* (*History of Yugoslavia*, 1933) promoted the new state ideology, but on the whole, most historians in Yugoslavia retained their allegiance and commitment to researching their own ethnically based national histories within Yugoslavia.[96]

Overall, as we have seen, an ethnic, increasingly racialised, deeply conservative historiography supported right-wing and fascist regimes right across Europe in the interwar period. Where those political forces had gained state power they often purged the historical profession of representatives of other forms of history and promoted exclusively the kind of history that was meant to bolster right-wing regimes.

Borders and Borderlands

In the heated nationalist atmosphere of the interwar period, the cases of Yugoslav national history or German Volksgeschichte demonstrate the utmost importance that historians attached to borders and borderlands. Especially where those borders were contested, and there happened to be an astonishing number of contested borders in the interwar period, one invariably found vociferous historiographical debates over such borders, often involving whole national historiographies. Take, for example, the battles between Polish and German historians after 1919 about the new eastern borders of Germany. On the German side, outrage over the Versailles Treaty spurned on historians to seek the revision of the new borders with historical arguments. On the Polish side, historians feverishly propagated the historical right of Poland to the territories it had gained under the Versailles Treaty. Thus, for example, historians were extremely active on both sides to provide arguments in the political battles surrounding the plebiscites in Eastern Prussia and Upper Silesia in 1920/21 that decided the national belonging of those

[95] Miquel A. Marin, *Los historiadores españoles en el franquismo 1948–1975. La historia local al servicio de la patria* (Zaragoza, 2005); Gonzalo Pasamar, *Historiografía e ideología en la postguerra española. La ruptura de la tradición liberal* (Zaragoza, 1991); for a summary in English see Pasamar, *Apología and Criticism: Historians and the History of Spain, 1500–2000* (Bern, 2010), chapter 3, which is especially good on Amerigo Castro, as well as the more general Andrés Antolín Hofrichter, 'Spanish History of Historiography – Recent Developments', *History Compass* 8:7 (2010), pp. 668–81.

[96] Dejan Djokić (ed.), *Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918–1992* (London, 2003); Ulf Brunnbauer, 'Yugoslavia', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 106.

regions in the interwar period. German Ostforschung battled it out with Polish Westforschung in an intricate historians' war that lasted for the entire interwar period only to be resumed under the circumstances of the post-Second World War territorial order.[97]

Similar history wars can be found in many parts of interwar Europe: to give just a few prominent examples of the importance of borders to interwar national histories. Czech and German national histories clashed in Bohemia and Moravia; italian and Austro-German narratives competed over South Tyrol and Trentino; Slovene and Austro-German accounts provided distinct stories of Lower Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola.[98] In the new nation state of Lithuania, historians were busy nationalising multicultural areas such as Vilnius and its surroundings by reference to an allegedly primevial Lithuania. The neighbouring disciplines of archaeology and ethnography justified claims that a population that was subjectively nationally indifferent was nevertheless objectively Lithuanian.[99] The influence of Social Darwinism and biological determinism only increased the strength of those claims to nationalise particular territories in Eastern and East-Central Europe, where nation states had emerged from the ruins of empires after 1918.

The peace settlements at the end of the First World War produced what became known as Greater Romania. The provinces of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania became part of Romania. They included universities in Cluj and Cernăuți that had to be Romanianised. Thus, an institutului de istorie națională (institute for National History) was set up at Cluj, and the Romanian state sponsored research institutes, regional branches of state archives and museums, all of which had the task of integrating the new regions into the enlarged Romanian state.[100]

The defeat of the Austro-Hungarian state in the First World War, and the dissolution of the Habsburg empire, brought with it a whole range of border conflicts and changes which had consequences for national history writing. Austria itself was one of the strangest cases: a new-found state without a national history or a national movement. Many Austrian Germans subscribed to transnational Habsburgism before 1914, the vast majority now turned to German nationalism

[97] Jan Piskorski with Jörg Hackmann and Rudolf Jaworski (eds), *Deutsche Ostforschung und polnische Westforschung im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Politik. Disziplinen im Vergleich* (Osnabrück, 2002); Jörg Hackmann, 'German East or Polish West? Historiographical Discourses on the German–Polish Overlap between Confrontation and Reconciliation, 1772–2000', in: Frank and Hadler (eds), *Disputed Territories*, pp. 92–124; on the debates after 1945 see chapter 6.

[98] For a good survey of those overlapping histories and their impact on national historical master narratives see the contributions in Frank and Hadler (eds), *Disputed Territories*.

[99] Vero Wendland, 'The Russian Empire and its Western Borderlands: National Historiographies and their "Others" in Russia, the Baltics and the Ukraine', in: Berger and Lorenz (eds), *Contested Nation*, p. 428; see also Aurelijus Gieda, 'Historiography and Society: Historik and the Dimensions of the Profession of a Historian and the Historical Culture in Lithuania in 1904–1940, Summary of Doctoral Dissertation, Vilnius 2013'.

[100] Murgescu, 'Romania', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 99.

and would have happily merged with the German Reich, had the Allies allowed such a move. As it was, the Allies pushed through the foundation of an independent Austrian state, which was faced with the task of state-building (let alone nation-building) – a process that few of its elites actually subscribed to or actively wanted. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that Austrian historians developed contacts with their German counterparts and many, led by Heinrich von Srbik (1878–1951), who held the chair of general history at the University of Vienna between 1920 and 1945, developed a pan-German version of history that legitimated the eventual merging of Austria with Germany in 1938. Very few historians, e.g. Ernst Karl Winter (1895–1959) attempted to construct an independent Austrian national identity.[101] Given the prevalence of the pan-German view among Austrian historians, their overwhelming support for the Anschluss in 1938 and their continued loyalty to National Socialism throughout much of the Second World War cannot be surprising.

National Historiographies under German Occupation in the Second World War

In many parts of Eastern Europe, the German occupation in the Second World War had disastrous consequences for the national historiographies of the occupied nations. In Poland, for example, it is estimated that 30 per cent of all Polish historians were killed by the Germans, who intended to destroy Poland's historical culture alongside all signs of its intellectual and cultural heritage. Large document collections in archives, museums and libraries were deliberately destroyed. In Czechoslovakia, the University of Prague was transformed into a bulwark of militant German nationalism, whilst Czech historians were persecuted and often had to fear for their lives under German occupation. In Romania, after Germany invaded the country in 1944, several history departments were closed, history professors were sacked and historical journals were shut down.[102]

In Western Europe, the German occupants did not proceed with the same brutality and ruthlessness. Here they sought the active collaboration and help of historians in the attempt to establish the future Germanic order in Europe. Thus, for example, German *Westforschung*, discussed above, tried to win the support of those Dutch historians like Pieter Geyl (1887–1966) and Frederik Carel Gerretson (1884–1958), who were well-known champions of a Greater Netherlands history, specifically directed against both the Belgicist national master narrative (epitomised by Pirenne) and a small Netherlands history, which had accommodated itself to the loss of Belgium. Geyl and Gerretson emphasised the linguistic and cultural community of all Dutch-speaking people. However, Geyl always kept his distance from attempts by German historians, such as Franz Petri, to exploit Geyl's ideas

[101] Werner Suppanz, Österreichische Geschichtsbilder. Historische Legitimation in Ständestaat und Zweiter Republik (Cologne, 1998).

[102] Frederick Kellogg, *A History of Romanian Historical Writing* (Bakersfield, CA, 1990), p. 45.

of a Greater Netherlands history to advocate Petri's own notions of a Greater Germany based on assumptions of common linguistic, cultural and ethnic tradition between German and Dutch speakers.[103] Although a small minority of Dutch scholars colluded with the Germans, the war saw a substantial increase in patriotic national history writing defending the historical trajectory of an independent Dutch state. In the interwar period, Johan Huizinga (1872–1945) had already come to argue that it was impossible to see Dutch civilisation simply as an offshoot of German culture. The Netherlands, he argued, inhabited a position about half way between England and Germany, with important influences also from France, and, increasingly, the USA.[104]

In Belgium we can see similar forms of resistance. Whilst the Deutsches Institut (German Institute) in Brussels, founded in 1942, undertook strenuous efforts to demonstrate the Germanic roots of Belgium, and whilst German censorship sought to prevent Belgian historians from talking about Belgium as a 'microcosm of Europe', the German occupying powers never committed enough resources to police the field of history writing effectively. Only a few Flemish nationalist historians, like Robert van Roosbroeck (1898–1988) and Hendrik Jozef Elias (1902–1973) cooperated closely with National Socialist Germany in order to foster their aim of Flemish nationalism in a German-dominated Europe.[105] Whether historians in the Low Countries decided to cooperate with their German counterparts or not, their impact on public opinion was greatest where the historians could maintain their credibility as scholars, thereby confirming that the scientificity of the profession could still work its charm.[106]

In France, historians associated with the right-wing Action Française, such as Jacques Bainville (1879–1936) and Pierre Gaxotte (1895–1982) achieved commercial success with their *Histoire de France* (*History of France*), published in 1924, but most professional historians retained their distance from overt right-wing history politics. The only university professor putting forward a racist interpretation of French history was the Swiss national George Montandon (1879–1944), who held a chair in anthropology in Paris in the interwar period and was not a trained historian.[107] He holds the dubious honour to have been the first, in 1915, to formulate the idea that ethnic cleansing should be used to solve ethnic and territorial conflict.[108] The Germans actively promoted his work after they occupied

[103] Niek van Sas, 'The Great Netherlands Controversy: a Clash of Great Historians', in: Frank and Hadler (eds), *Disputed Territories*, pp. 152–74.
[104] Tollebeek, 'At the Crossroads of Nationalism', p. 197.
[105] Marnix Beyen, 'Natural-Born Nations: National Historiography in Belgium and the Netherlands between a Tribal and a Social-Cultural Paradigm, 1900–1950', *Storia della Storiografia* 38 (2007), p. 44 f.
[106] Marnix Beyen, 'Resisting Hyperbole. Professional Historians in Belgium and the Netherlands and the Relationship with Wartime Historical Culture (1940–1945)', *Storia della Storiografia* 53 (2008), pp. 130–44.
[107] George Montandon, *L'éthnie française* (Paris, 1935).
[108] George Montandon, *Frontières nationales: Détermination objectif de la condition primordiale necessaire à l'obtention d'une paix durable* (Lausanne, 1915).

the country in 1940. The Vichy government encouraged views of history that would lend support to the 'national revolution' of 1940. The cult of Joan of Arc was revitalised, for example, to strengthen anti-English feeling in occupied France. A professor of ancient history, Jérôme Carcopino (1881–1970) was appointed Minister of Education of the Vichy regime in 1941 and his promotion of a national archaeology was directly aimed at constructing a new national master narrative that glorified the folklore and peasant traditions of France. Most of the university historians retained their distance to such instrumentalisation of history in the service of the Vichy regime, and some even joined the Resistance in order to work for the liberation of their country from German occupation. The most prominent example was, of course, Marc Bloch, who joined the Resistance under the name of Narbonne around the turn of 1942/43. Using the pseudonym M. Blanchars, he wrote several articles for the Lyon-based *Franc Tireur* and undertook a variety of other activities on behalf of the Resistance. Arrested by the Gestapo in March 1944, he was tortured and eventually executed in June 1944.[109]

Where National Socialist Germany set up puppet states in Eastern Europe, those newly sovereign nations quickly attempted to construct their own historical master narratives. In the case of Slovakia, František Hrušovský (1903–1956) had already provided a Catholic-nationalist master narrative for the new nation state in the form of his *Dejiny Slovákov* (*The History of the Slovaks*) published in 1939. The new regime invested considerable resources in the historical profession. The Slovenská academia vied a umení (Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts) was established in 1942, and, just one year later the institute of History was created within the academy. In 1942, the Štátny archeologický ústav (State Institute of Archeology) also came into being. However, as the Slovak state had purged all Czech professors from Bratislava, they had to replace them with young and inexperienced Slovak historians, who did not have any time to leave their mark on the profession before the end of the war.[110]

In the fascist independent State of Croatia between 1941 and 1944 we see similar attempts to legitimate the new state via history, in particular through the newly founded *Časopis za hrvatsku poviest* (*Journal for Croatian History*).[111] But here, as in Slovakia, time was too short and the end of the war saw the establishment of Communist regimes, which were to implement their own national master narratives after 1945. Given the expansion of communism in Eastern and East-Central Europe at the end of the Second World War, variants of Communist national master narratives were implemented across one-half of Europe. Many of them oriented themselves towards the Communist national master narrative that had emerged in the Soviet Union under the Bol'ševiks.

[109] Bertram Gordon, 'Right-Wing Historiographical Models in France, 1918–1945', in: Berger, Donovan and Passmore (eds), *Writing National Histories*, pp. 163–75; Francine Michaud, 'Marc Bloch (1886–1944)', in: Philip Daileader and Philip Whalen (eds), *French Historians 1900–2000: New Historical Writing in Twentieth-Century France* (Chichester, 2010), p. 58.
[110] Adam Hudek, 'Slovakia', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 152 f.
[111] Ulf Brunnbauer, 'Croatia', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 102 f.

Mutations of Communist Historiography

In 1917 the victory of the Bol'ševiks in the Soviet Union enabled a self-proclaimed working-class movement to gain complete state power for the first time. Over the following years, amidst a bloody civil war, the Bol'ševiks erected a dictatorship of one party, which did not allow any opposition to their regime. What was the Bol'ševiks' vision of national history and how did it contribute to legitimating their regime? Committed to Marxism-Leninism, Bol'ševik historiography stood in a tradition of Marxist historiography, best represented in Russia by Georgij Plechanov (1857–1918). Plechanov's *Istorija russkoj obščestvennoj mysli* (*History of Russian Social Thought*), published in 1909, prioritised class over nation in line with Marxist thinking. However, he also gave much attention to Russian national history, which he described as deviating in major ways from the history of West European nation states. Russian national history was closer to certain oriental and Asiatic societies than West European ones, which explained much of Russia's backwardness. According to Plechanov, despotism and immobility became the hallmarks of Russian national development. Whereas in the West the Marxist idea of different stages of economic production succeeding each other until capitalism was reached, was valid, in Russia, primitive communism was followed directly by oriental despotism. In other words, Russia was not yet a developed capitalist country, which also made it the most unlikely location for a successful working-class revolution.[112]

Many shared the belief in Russia's backwardness. Leon Trockij, in his *1905* and his *Istorija russkoj revoljucii* (*History of the Russian Revolution*), upheld notions of Russian peculiarity which he traced back to its oriental character and strong étatisme. Lenin and Stalin, by contrast, were arguing before 1917 that Russia's historical development was in line with that of the West and therefore it could take the lead in the world-wide destruction of capitalism. Russia would show Europe the road to communist salvation. However, once the Bol'ševiks had gained power, they were still faced with the problem of providing historical legitimation for their revolution and for the success of a Communist government in a country very widely perceived as 'backward'. Enter Michail Pokrovskij, who became the undisputed leader of Soviet Marxist historiography in the 1920s, nicknamed 'Supreme Commander of the Army of Red Historians'.[113] He gave early Soviet historiography an internationalist orientation, abhorred Russian nationalism and was adamant that it was important for Marxist historians to look beyond the narrow confines of national history. As People's Commissar for Education he prohibited any history teaching which promoted nationalism. In his own writings, he put heavy emphasis on social and economic developments in history, which, he argued, were essential to document the class struggle in history.

[112] Samuel H. Baron, *Plekhanov. The Father of Russian Marxism* (Stanford, 1963).
[113] G.M. Enteen, *The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat. M.N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians* (London, 1978).

Despite all this, he still could not escape national history. His *Russkaja Istorija v samom sžatom očerke* (*Brief History of Russia*) was approved by no lesser figure than Lenin, and it served as bible for the first generation of Marxist-Leninist historians in the Soviet Union. As a national history it was indeed trying to establish a new national master narrative, which portrayed the history of Tsarist Russia as 'dark other', where not only the working classes but also the non-Russian nationalities were repressed. He contrasted the Russian past sharply to the bright Communist future of the Soviet Union under Bol'ševism. In line with Marxist thinking, he portrayed the history of Russia as a history of class struggles, but contrary to Plechanov and Trotsky, Pokrovskij described Russian historical development as essentially following the same trajectory as that of Western Europe. He insisted on universal patterns of historical development and was highly critical of all ideas of Russian exceptionalism. He analysed the emergence of the strong Russian state within the framework of the Russian variant of feudalism and insisted on the importance of merchant capital for the development of the later Russian empire. A capitalist economy replaced Russian feudalism from the sixteenth century onwards. By assimilating Russian history to the West European model, Pokrovskij gave historical explanation and justification to the Russian revolution of 1917.

The other major Russian Marxist historian of the 1920s, Nikolaj Aleksandrovič Rožkov (1868–1927), was highly critical of such strategies of legitimation. Turning from Bol'ševism to the oppositional Men'ševism in the 1920s, he provided a powerful historical critique of Bol'ševism, whilst writing a form of comparative economic history of Russia, which was far superior to all other Marxist historical writing in the early Soviet Union. Especially his 12-volume *Russkija istorija v strativelno-istoričeskom osveščenij* (*Russian History from a Comparative Historical Viewpoint*), published between 1919 and 1926 set the standards for Marxist historiography in Russia for a long time to come. His Marxism did not protect him from political persecution. He was arrested several times in 1921 and 1922 and his work was routinely denounced as Men'ševik.[114]

The Bol'ševiks were quick to set up their own institutions where a fledgling Communist historiography could be nourished, which was explicitly to justify the nascent Communist state.[115] The Socialističeskaja akademija (Socialist Academy of Social Sciences (later renamed Kommunističeskaja akademija (Communist Academy), founded in 1918, the Komissija po istorii Oktjabrskoj revoljucii i RKP(b) (Commission for the Study of History of October Revolution and the Bol'ševik Party), established in 1920 (and soon having many local branches), as well as the Institut K. Marksa i F. Engelsa (institute of Marx and Engels, 1919) and the separate Institut Lenina (institute of Lenin, 1923) all served this purpose. In fact the last three institutions merged into the Institut Marksa-Engelsa-Lenina

[114] J.A.G. Rondan, *Nikolai Aleksandrovic Rozhkov: Historian and Revolutionary* (Wollongong, 1996).
[115] Arup Banerij, *Writing History in the Soviet Union. Making the Past Work* (New Delhi, 2008); see also Anatole G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography* (Princeton, NJ, 1958); Konstantin F. Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1962).

(Institute of Marx, Engels and Lenin) in the late 1920s and from then on had the task of watching over the ideological correctness of historical research in the Soviet Union. It also transformed the October revolution into the crucial foundational event for the Soviet national master narrative – a moment in history when the Russian people not only liberated themselves and the other nationalities in the Tsarist empire, but set a shining example for the rest of mankind to free themselves from capitalist and imperialist oppression. The Soviet Union thus became the motherland of the working classes everywhere on the globe. Hence, Soviet universal history, which could look back onto a long tradition in Russia, was preoccupied with demonstrating how the world historical development culminated in the foundation and development of the Soviet Union as the most highly developed and most progressive state in the contemporary world.[116]

The institut krasnoj professury (IKP, Institute of Red Professors, 1921–1936) was specifically charged with training a new cohort of Marxist historians who were to populate the university departments of the Soviet Union from the late 1920s onwards and who were keen to reconfigure history as part and parcel of the social sciences. From 1921, the Institute of History at the Rossiskaja Associacija Naučno-issledovatel'skich institutov Obščestvennych Nauk (Russian Association of Research Institutions of Social Sciences), gave central direction to an increasingly stage-managed historical production. The Institut istorii Akademii nauk SSSR (History Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences) was thoroughly purged from 'bourgeois elements' and made into a bulwark of Bol'ševism in the 1930s. Under Pokrovskij in the 1920s, the Bol'ševiks did not want to break with bourgeois historiography entirely, as they feared a major loss of scholarly capacity, but in the 1930s, in the post-Pokrovskij era, these concerns had become irrelevant. The Obščestvo Istorikov-marksistov (Society of Marxist Historians) was founded in 1925 and set the task of replacing the older bourgeois historiography of prerevolutionary Russia. 'Bourgeois' historians, such as Aleksandr Evgen'evič Presnjakov (1870–1929), who had come to accept the Bol'ševik revolution 'as another step in the ongoing process of national unification' of Russia, had been able to continue their work in the early Soviet Union and were even elected as academicians, but in the 1930s it became near impossible not to accept the Stalinist philosophy of history.[117] A whole host of Marxist-Leninist journals were established in the 1920s, which served as an important forum for a Marxist historiography seeking to compete with and ultimately overcome its bourgeois rival. The most important of these journals was the *Istorik-marksist* (*Marxist Historian*), in which 80 to 90 per cent of all articles were written by party members. It gave direction and purpose to wider Marxist historiography in the Soviet Union.[118] The Bol'ševiks increased the

[116] Hans Hecker, *Russische Universalgeschichtsschreibung. Von den 'Vierziger Jahren' des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zur sowjetischen 'Weltgeschichte' (1955–1965)* (Munich, 1983).
[117] On Presnjakov see Alfred J. Rieber, 'Introduction', in: A. E. Presniakov, *The Formation of the Great Russian State* (Chicago, 1970), quote on p. xxviii.
[118] Lutz-Dieter Behrend, 'Der Istorik-marksist als Leitorgan der sowjetischen Historiker', in: Middell (ed.), *Historische Zeitschriften*, pp. 133–45.

number of universities and created RabFaks (abbreviation of Rabočij Fakul'tet, workers' faculty), which were meant to be training grounds for new Marxist working-class academics – the Soviet Union's new intellectual elite. The creation of Marxist scientific cadres dominated the endeavours of the Bol'ševiks in their policies regarding higher education. The historical archives were also completely reorganised. Whilst an acute paper shortage during the revolutionary years and the years of civil war condemned whole archives to the paper mills (for recycling), the Soviet state subsequently abolished many of the Imperial archives and transferred the Tsarist archives from Petrograd (formerly Saint-Petersburg) to Moscow, beginning a great centralising tendency in Soviet archiving practice.

Throughout much of the 1920s, many 'bourgeois' historians were at least allowed to continue with their work, even if they were occasionally harassed and arrested. But the year 1929 marked a turning point in the Communist state's policy vis-à-vis non-Marxist scholarship. A large group of academics from the Academy of Sciences were now accused of conspiring to overthrow Communism and banished for several years to provincial towns far away from Moscow and Leningrad. Beginning in 1929, bourgeois historians and Marxist ones who were accused of deviating from the party line, were arrested, exiled or killed. The Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences itself came under the direct leadership of the Kommunističeskaja akademija (Communist Academy). Stalin took a great personal interest in historiography, and it was his views which now came to shape, or better, deform the historical profession in the Soviet Union.[119] He insisted that it was not empirical scholarship but the accomplishments of the Bol'ševiks and, above all, the theoretical genius of Stalin himself, which were to form the benchmarks against which historians had to measure their work. Those who remained dedicated to producing work based on sound archival evidence rather than ideological prescription were denounced by Stalin as 'archive rats'. Whilst Pokrovskij had insisted on the importance of solid empirical evidence and spoken out against the falsification of historical facts in pursuit of political aims, Stalin, in his attack on evidence-based historiography, could build on Leninist notions that the party line was to guide the historians more than historical evidence, as true objectivity could only be achieved through identifying with the Communist Party's explication of the laws which governed historical processes (*partijnost'*). The Communist Party, representing all 'progressive' traditions in history, held the key to historical interpretation, and all deviations from its line were necessarily 'reactionary'. With the implementation of the personality cult around Stalin, the fountain of all historical wisdom was not even the Party any more, but its 'great leader'. Accusations of Trotskyism were used widely in order to purge and persecute historians. 'Criticism and self-criticism' sessions became a routine practice of humiliating those who were charged with deviation from the party line.

Stalin's turn away from internationalism and towards the theory of 'socialism in one country' had important implications for Soviet historiography, as he now

[119] John Barber, *Soviet Historians in Crisis, 1928–1932* (London, 1981).

charged historians with producing patriotic narratives which were to legitimate Bol'ševik rule in the Soviet Union.[120] Historians were to prioritise the history of Russia over the history of all other Soviet republics, as it was Russian history which was perceived as anchor-point of Soviet state building. Russian ethnic particularism was to characterise much of Soviet historical writing from the 1930s to the 1950s. Pokrovskij had denounced the Tsarist state as an imperialist venture which repressed native ethnicities. Soviet historiography in the post-Pokrovskij era, by contrast, came to endorse the view that Russia was the vanguard nation in the Soviet Union, because it had shown itself to be historically superior to the other nations making up the Soviet Union.[121] Russians were depicted as elder brother to the other nationalities in the Tsarist empire. All had suffered under its autocracy, but there was also an insinuation that non-Russian nationalities had been brought to similar cultural and civilisational standards as the Russians. Under the leadership of the 'older brother', all nationalities had ultimately regained freedom in the Bol'ševik revolution, and were building the workers' paradise of the Soviet Union. Given that millions of Soviet citizens had just recently learned to read and write, and given that national consciousness in Tsarist Russia was developed rather weakly, Stalin perceived history as major ally in his drive to construct unity and purpose around the notion of Soviet patriotism. The enemies of the working classes thus became enemies of the Soviet people, or the Russian people and its sister peoples.

Historians now harked back to many of the traditional heroical myths underpinning nationalist histories of Russia already in Tsarist times. One of Russia's greatest writers, Aleksandr Puškin (1799–1837), was transformed into a Stalinist icon.[122] Ivan the Terrible (1530–1584) and Peter the Great (1672–1725) became national heroes once again, and the making of a strong national Russian state was commented on approvingly, even if it was an oppressive class state.[123] In Andrej Vasil'evič Šestakov's (1877–1941) *Short Course in the History of the USSR*, published in 1937 to replace Pokrovskij's earlier work, the Russian past was linked positively to the Soviet present. In Pokrovskij, the Russian past had been the necessary precondition for the Soviet present, but it had not figured positively, quite the contrary. In Šestakov's text, on the other hand, the reader is expressly invited to identify with the heroes of Russian history. Thus the book starts: 'The

[120] A. Powell, 'The Nationalist Trend in Soviet Historiography', *Soviet Studies* 2:4 (1951), pp. 361–79.
[121] Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State 1923–1938* (Ithaca, NY, 2001).
[122] Alter L. Litvin, *Writing History in Twentieth-Century Russia*, (Houndmills, 2001); K. Petrone, *'Life has become more joyous, comrades': Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington, IN, 2000); Lindner, *Historiker und Herrschaft*, pp. 147–330 on Stalinist historiography.
[123] Maureen Perrie, *The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin's Russia* (New York, 2001); C.E. Black, 'The Reforms of Peter the Great', in: idem (ed.), *Rewriting Russian History. Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past*, 2nd edition (New York, 1962), pp. 235–48; Benjamin Schenk, *Alexandr Nevskij: Heiliger–Fürst–Nationalheld. Eine Erinnerungsfigur im russischen kulturellen Gedächtnis (1263–2000)* (Cologne, 2004).

USSR is the land of socialism. There is only one socialist country on the globe – it is our motherland.' And it closes: 'We love our motherland and we must know her wonderful history well. Whoever knows history will better understand current life, will fight the enemies of our country better, and will consolidate socialism.'[124] Soviet patriotism and love for the socialist motherland became guiding lights of Soviet national historiography thereafter.[125] The nationalist turn of Soviet historiography was accompanied by the return of events- and personality-based narratives, which were devoid of any theoretical ambition or framework, be it Marxist or Leninist or anything else.

The transformation of historiography in Russia described above was mirrored in other Soviet republics and led to the setting up of new Communist historical societies, institutions, and journals. In line with early Soviet policies of giving the different Soviet nationalities room to develop, Ukrainian and Byelorussian historians were focusing on their respective national histories throughout the 1920s. In fact, the leading historian of Ukraine, Mychajlo Hruševs'kyj (1866–1934),[126] returned from his exile in Prague in 1924 to head efforts to nationalise Ukrainian historical consciousness in the Soviet Union. However, the 1930s witnessed a major attempt to repress such 'national orientation' of the Russian 'sister peoples'. Historical studies in Charkiv, Kiev and Odessa almost ceased entirely to work on Ukrainian issues. Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalism' was denounced as counter-revolutionary, and instead historical scholarship concentrated on demonstrating how social and economic progress in Ukraine had been fostered historically by the strong alliance with and under the leadership of the Russian 'older brother'. The Tsarist annexation of other nationalities, including the Ukrainian one, was celebrated as 'lesser evil' in comparison to their possible incorporation into other empires, such as the Ottoman empire, the British empire or the Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth.[127]

In contrast to the strong national historiographical tradition, which had emerged in Ukraine well before 1917, the situation in Byelorussia was quite different.[128] Most of the institutions of Byelorussian historical research were founded only in the brief period of national independence between 1918 and 1919. After it had become a Soviet republic in 1919, the first Byelorussian university and a Belaruskaja Akademija Navuk (Byelorussian Academy of Sciences) were set up in the 1920s. Its Institute of history focused almost exclusively on national history, and Byelorussian scholars were as keen as scholars of other 'new' nations to provide historical proof for the long-term existence of a separate Byelorussian nationality. They could build on earlier writings of amateur historians, such as Vatslaŭ Lastoŭski (1883–1938), and they traced back the existence of a Byelorussian

[124] Cited in Anatole G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, 2nd edition (Princeton, NJ, 1958), p. 204.
[125] D.L. Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity 1931–1956* (Cambridge, MA, 2002).
[126] On Hruševs'kyj compare chapter 4, pp. 140–3.
[127] Renata Latala, 'Ukraine', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 93 f.
[128] Anna Zadora, 'Belarus', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 85 f.

nationality to the early Middle Ages and the Duchy of Polock (today's Polack). Like Polish and Lithuanian historical master narratives, their Byelorussian counterparts saw in the Polish–Lithuanian commonwealth the high point of an independent Byelorussian nation state, although, subsequently, domination by Poles, Lithuanians and Russians justified a centuries-long struggle for national independence. However, as in Ukraine, the Communist state clamped down on the nascent national master narrative in the 1930s, fearful that it might encourage separatism.

The Second World War cemented the strong relationship between history writing and Russian / Soviet nationalism. Soviet historians presented the Great Patriotic War as the latest in a long line of battles in which the Russian nation had defeated its enemies and rivals, be they Mongols (Battle on the river Kalka, 1223), Teutonic Knights (Battle on the ice, 1242), Tatars (Battle of Kulikovo Field, 1380), Swedes and Ottomans (Battle of Poltava, 1709) or Napoleon's Grande Armée (Patriotic War of 1812). In the war, bourgeois national historians, such as Sergej Michajlovič Solov'ëv (1820–1879) and Vasilij Osipovič Ključevskij (1841–1911) and their national(ist) writings were held up by Soviet historians as shining examples of Russian achievements in historical research. But ironically, the Second World War did not only bring about a massive increase in nationalist histories of Russia and the Soviet Union, it also led to the flowering of national history of other Soviet republics. So, for example, the Soviet authorities decided to transform the Polish John Casimir University in L'vov (today's L'viv) in Soviet-occupied Poland into the L'vivs'kyj nacional'nyj Universitet imeni Ivana Franka (Ivan Franko National University of L'viv), and, in a conscious attempt to integrate the occupied territories into the Soviet Union and promote a historical justification for such annexation, it asked Ukrainian scholars formerly dismissed by the Polish state to return to the university in order to foster historical studies on Ukrainian history. History was to legitimate the occupation as the 'liberation' of Ukrainian territories from Polish rule.

If the Soviet historical master narrative in the interwar period ended up every bit as nationalist and ethnocentric as its European counterparts and perhaps more so than its Tsarist Russian predecessor, one should point out that there were examples of historical institutions and individual historians on the left refusing the lure of national(ist) history. Some of the historical writings produced by European anarchists, most of whom were amateurs without a university or academy position, were characterised by a deliberate rejection of national perspectives. One of the most influential theorists of the international anarchist movement, Rudolf Rocker (1873–1958), had, after all, famously defined anarchism in opposition to patriotism, which he perceived as 'the religion of the modern state'.[129] Among historical institutions, the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (International Institute for Social History, IISG) in Amsterdam, founded in 1935 by Nicolaas Wilhelmus Postumus (1880–1960), was prominent in upholding

[129] Rudolf Rocker, 'Prinzipienerklärung der Syndikalisten' [1924], reprinted in: *Arbeiterselbstverwaltung, Rätesyndikalismus* (Berlin, 1969).

transnational and internationalist perspectives and working against the grain of methodological nationalism in history. The IISG was vital in rescuing the archival legacy of labour movements threatened by fascist and Communist regimes.[130] The personal papers of Marx, Engels and Bakunin were preserved here, as were the papers of exiled parties, such as those of the Russian Men'ševiks or the German Social Democrats. Later, the archive of the Socialist Workers' International also found a home there. The IISG thus worked as a decidedly transnational and internationalist archive, and its research agenda was to reflect this commitment to class and labour history that looked beyond national borders.

Western Marxism rarely found a positive reception in European history departments outside the Soviet Union in the interwar period. Few history professors were self-professed Marxists. Yet Marxism began to engage historians in productive ways also in the West. The rise of social and economic history beginning in the late nineteenth century was inspired by a – more competitive than sympathetic – dialogue with various forms of Marxist history. The leading economic and social history journals, such as the *Vierteljahresschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte* (*Economic and Social History Quarterly*), founded in 1903, and the *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* (*Economic and Social History Review*), founded in 1913, mirrored such (mostly negative) engagement. In England, R.H. Tawney (1880–1962) drew on Marx more positively in his lectures on economic history that he delivered to working men through the Workers' Educational Association from 1908 onwards.[131] Marc Bloch's synthesis on medieval society, which he put under the conceptual heading of 'feudalism', would also have been unthinkable without an engagement with Marxism.[132] The focus on a common social system allowed Bloch to treat the countries of Europe together and to develop both their internal dynamics and the external power relations between them.

In France, a whole school of the history of the Revolution developed from the late nineteenth century onwards that highlighted economic causes for the outbreak of the revolution. It produced work on the modes of production in pre-revolutionary France, class struggles and other mass protests and is associated with names such as François-Alphonse Aulard (1849–1928), Jean Jaurès (1859–1914), Georges Lefebvre (1874–1959) and Albert Mathiez (1874–1932). Representatives of this school in the interwar period had a strong orientation towards the Communist Party, and after the end of the Second World War they gained official access to the academic core institutions – with Albert Soboul (1914–1982) becoming its undisputed champion. Soboul, a member of the Communist Party since 1932, was appointed to the prestigious chair of the history of the French revolution at the Sorbonne in 1967.

[130] Maria Hunink, *De papieren van de revolutie. Het Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis*, (Amsterdam, 1986).
[131] On the development of economic history in Britain, see D.C. Coleman, *History and the Economic Past: an Account of the Rise and Decline of Economic History in Britain* (Oxford, 1987).
[132] Marc Bloch, *La société féodale*, 2 volumes (Paris, 1939 and 1940).

The interwar perlod also saw the beginnings of a Marxist historiography in Britain. The Great Depression and the rise of fascism in Europe formed the backdrop against which a range of historians began to engage with Marxist thought. Whilst some, such as G.D.H. Cole (1889–19S9) and Tawney were close to the Labour Party, others, such as Maurice Dobb (1900–1976), Dona Torr (1883–19S7) and Arthur Leslie Morton (1903–1987) joined the Communist Party. Cole became one of the foremost historians of the labour movement in Britain. He always stressed that the value of Marx's work for his own history writing lay in Marx's emphasis on the dynamism and openness of the historical process.[133] Tawney famously insisted in his inaugural iecture that all serious history had to start from the work of Marx, but once again, his Marxist history was far removed from the dogmatic and mechanistic application of Marx's theory that came to characterise Soviet historiography under Stalin.[134] Dobb's work as an economic historian was focused on the transition from feudalism to capitalism and culminated in his 1946 book *Studies in the Development of Capitalism*. Torr's and Morton's work was committed, above all, to the democratisation of the British historical national master narrative. They coined the term 'people's history' to refer to a history that focused on the lower social classes and on ordinary men and women rather than on rulers and the powerful. In particular Morton's *A People's History of England* (1938) became a foundational text in establishing this genre. This national history highlighted not Magna Carta, but the Peasant Rising of 1381; it underiined not the slow progress of parliamentary reform, but the impact of the Levellers and Diggers. Time and again we encounter forms of crowd politics in the forms of Luddism, Chartism and Jacobinism. And we are introduced to the idea of class struggles drlving the historical process forward. It is, in other words, the recovery of a radical democratic tradition in English history that marks this kind of national history off from older forms of Whig national history.

Torr frequently warned against economic determinism, stressing instead the historical agency of ordinary people in the historical process. Arguably, her writings were influential in steering the Marxist Historians' Group, founded in 1946, and incorporating a younger generation of British Marxist historians, such as Eric Hobsbawm (1917–2012), E.P. Thompson (1924–1993), George Rudé (1910–1993), Rodney Hilton (1916–2002), Christopher Hill (1912–2003) and Raphael Samuel (1934–1996), away from an all-too-mechanistic application of Marxist theory to historical practice.

Whilst we have chosen to concentrate on the examples of France and Britain, in other parts of Europe, Marxist historiography was also on the rise, and produced various debates on the merits and shortcoming of Marxist approaches to history writing.[135]

[133] Luther P. Carpenter, *G.D.H. Cole: an Intellectual Biography* (Cambridge, 1973), p. 227.
[134] Anthony Wright, *R.H. Tawney* (Manchester, 1987), p. 127.
[135] Harvey J. Kaye, *The British Marxist Historians* (New York, 1988).

History Writing from Exile – The Anti-fascist and Anti-Communist Experience

The totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century were, of course, by no means the first to drive historians into exile. The phenomenon of historians on the run from states and polities which did not tolerate their historical views is as old as the historical profession itself. The situation of exile often produced social hardship and misery, and it frequently led to an alienation of the historian from his historical roots and his sources. After all, most exiled historians had to leave behind their libraries and research materials and found themselves in financially precarious situations. But situations of exile also led to productive engagements with the historiography of the exiled historians' new domicile, which at times allowed them to promote innovative and revisionist accounts of their homeland's history. Hence, the level of innovation in exile historiographies was, and arguably continues to be, high, as it forces the historian to leave the national framework and engage with diverse transnational contexts. Pavel Gavriilovič Vinogradov's (1854–1925) work at the University of Oxford and the École Russe de Hautes Études Sociales de Paris before 1914 is a telling example of such innovatory perspectives on Russian national history, especially agrarian history, produced in exile.[136]

Fascist regimes and the Communist Soviet Union did not tolerate opposition to their particular views on historical development. Whilst Marxist-Leninist and later Stalinist historiography increasingly resembled a static scheme of various stages of history which all moved inevitably towards communism, fascist historiographies were more difficult to categorise and were based on a less uniform view of historical development. in both Italy and Germany, fascism and National Socialism proved quite willing to work together with professional historians (many of whom were traditionally conservative and shared at least some of the worldviews of fascist regimes), as long as they did not question the authority of the regimes or showed themselves otherwise disloyal. There were, of course, exceptions to the rule: Jewish, Marxist or democratic historians were rarely tolerated. All in all, in both Communist and fascist regimes significant numbers of historians were exiled or chose to leave the country either because they felt threatened or they could not continue their work. These exile historians often lived precarious existences at the margins of historical professions in their respective host countries. However, some also managed to make it into the mainstream, and there were certainly influential national histories produced by exile historians from both fascism and Bol'ševism. In what follows we concentrate on the examples of Fascist Italy, National Socialist Germany and the Communist Soviet Union.

The vast majority of Italian and German historians made their peace with the regimes when they came to power in 1923 and 1933 respectively. When the Italian state, in 1931, required every university professor to swear an oath of

[136] Edoardo Tortarolo, 'Historians in the Storm. Émigré Historiography in the Twentieth Century', in: Matthias Middell and Lluis Roura (eds), *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing* (Basingstoke, 2012), pp. 377–403.

allegiance to the regime, only 12 professors of about 1200 totally refused and chose retirement or exile over continuing their work under the Fascist government.[137] But no historian was among them. When a similar oath for members of academies and learned societies was introduced in 1933, Croce, who lived as an independent gentleman-scholar rather than a salaried history professor, informed the Fascist minister that he was loyal only to academic freedom.

The National Socialist regime dismissed all civil servants (which includes university professors in Germany) it deemed either Jewish or politically unreliable in April 1933. It is unlikely that the number of historians dismissed as a consequence of these purges exceeded 100, and this figure includes non-professorial staff. Many of those who went into exile initially stayed close to their country of origin in the hope that the fascist regimes would soon collapse, allowing them to return to their positions and the places they called 'home'. The majority of exiles from totalitarian dictatorships ultimately settled in the United States, where the system of higher education seemed most willing to create openings for them. In case of the German exiles, it can be said that they subsequently educated and deeply influenced a whole generation of American scholars of German history.[138] Similar claims have been made for the unusually strong cohort of British post-war historians writing on Europe and Germany in particular.[139]

German émigré scholars provided alternative historical national master narratives to the ones championed in National Socialist Germany and the immediate post-war years. Good examples include Veit Valentin's (1885–1947) *History of the Germans* of 1946 and Hajo Holborn's (1902–1969) *History of Modern Germany* of 1964, which was so important in steering the next generation of historians of Germany towards social and economic history. Valentin had been ostracised by his conservative-nationalist colleagues in Weimar Germany for his beliefs in liberal democracy, which also informed his historical writings on the 1848/49 revolution. He was only able to secure a position at the Reich archive, from where he was dismissed in 1933. Fleeing first to London and later to the United States, he was never able to secure a permanent position in exile, and he died in Washington in 1947.

Holborn, like Valentin and a handful of other Weimar historians, e.g. Erich Eyck (1878–1964) and Eckhard Kehr (1902–1933), a committed democrat and outspoken proponent of the Weimar Republic, had secured a post at Yale University by 1934 and, in 1967, he became the first foreign-born President of the American Historical Association, indicating how strongly integrated he was into the American system of

[137] Helmut Goetz, *Der freie Geist und seine Widersacher. Die Eidverweigerer an den italienischen Universitäten im Jahre 1931* (Frankfurt 1993).
[138] Hartmut Lehmann and James J. Sheehan (eds), *An Interrupted Past. German-Speaking Refugee Historians in the United States after 1933* (Cambridge, 1991); Gerhard A. Ritter, 'Meinecke's Protégés: German Émigré Historians between Two Worlds', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington* 39 (2006), 23–38.
[139] Richard Evans, *Cosmopolitan Islanders. British Historians and the European Continent* (Cambridge, 2009), p. 156 f.; Peter Alter (ed.), *Out of the Third Reich: Refugee Historians in Post-War Britain* (London, 1998).

higher education. Some of the exiled historians, like Holborn, not only influenced national historical consciousness in their erstwhile homelands, but also played an influential role in the academies of their host countries; they were, and consciously saw themselves as, bridge-builders between different national traditions of historiography. Holborn, like another emigré historian, Felix Gilbert (1905–1991),[140] was an important member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the USA, which was an intelligence agency but also an institution where scholars from the USA and exiled scholars from Europe learnt from each other in an extraordinary incidence of cultural transfer of ideas and practices.

Hans Rosenberg's (1904–1988) writings on Prussian history had a major impact on German master narratives, too. He emphasised that Germany's failure to establish a viable democracy after 1919 was rooted in longer term socio-economic developments of the country. His analysis contributed in an important way to the negative inversion of the German Sonderweg in Anglo-Saxon scholarship after 1945 and in West Germany from the 1960s onwards. German émigré historians and their American pupils also turned their attention to ideological factors, the ideas which made Germany 'deviate' from the West and embark on a path which allegedly culminated in the victory of National Socialism. They concentrated on examining the failure of the democratic and left-wing forces in imperial and Weimar Germany, and, with Rosenberg, pointed to underlying socio-economic explanations for the 'peculiarities' of German history.

By comparison with their German counterparts, Italian historians were far less successful in rewriting the Italian historical master narrative in exile. This was partly to do with the fact that nationalist interpretations of the Risorgimento had already been undermined and discredited in the 1900s and 1910s. Hence there was much less need to revise the national historical master narrative in Italy than there was in Germany. Furthermore, important historians in Italy, most notably Croce, presented historical interpretations which were clearly not in line with the historical consciousness propagated by the Fascist regime. Hence, again, there was arguably less urgency for the exiled historians to provide alternative master narratives. Salvemini, whose most important book in exile was a study of Italian foreign policy under Fascism, was undoubtedly the single most important Italian historian in exile, and, like his German counterparts, he spent much of his time working on a historical explanation for the victory of Fascism in Italy – despite having been, by training and career track, a distinguished medievalist. His exile in the United States brought him to endorse a view of history as a social science, moving away from the traditions of intellectual history which had been so powerful in Italy. A fellow exile, Angelo Tasca (1892–1960), also wrote on the Fascist coup and the reasons for its success whilst being in exile. Those exiles who did not focus on Fascism in their historical work were still often influenced by their experience of it. The young Franco Venturi (1914–1994), for example, chose to focus

[140] On Gilbert see Hartmut Lehmann (ed.), *Felix Gilbert as Scholar and Teacher* (Washington, 1992).

on the European Enlightenment, because it was, for him, the counter-programme to the barbarity that he had experienced. The idea of freedom, as symbolised by Enlightenment thought, was contrasted to the nationalist hubris and the oppression of Fascist Italy.[141]

The rethinking of German national history by exiled historians from National Socialism was deeply interconnected with their encounter with Western and liberal-democratic regimes and their political as well as institutional practices. It led to the formulation of the fundamental question of why the historical development in Germany during the modern period had been so different from the West and, in normative terms, it made historians regret the 'peculiarities' of German national history. If only Germany could have been more 'Western', perhaps the series of catastrophes which befell Germany and Europe in the twentieth century, could have been avoided. But encounters with Western societies did not always lead to normative and analytical reorientation of exiled historians. One of the most prominent intellectual movements arising out of those scholars exiled by the Soviet Union in the interwar period was Eurasianism, in other words the notion that Russian history cannot be understood without taking account of its position in between Europe and Asia. Eurasianism did not only justify Russian imperial ambitions, it also served as an ideology which drew strict boundaries between Russia and the West. Most Eurasianists tended to be essentialists when it came to identitarian concepts of Russianness and most were vociferously anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-pluralist and anti-Western.[142] In other words, whilst the encounter with the West made exiles from National Socialist Germany wish that German history had been more in line with Western developments, the same encounter led Eurasianist exiles from the Soviet Union to emphasise positively the differences between Russian and Western historical development.

The first wave of émigré historians from the Soviet Union settled mostly in Berlin, Prague, Belgrade, Riga, Warsaw, Sofia, Paris and Harbin, but ultimately, as in the case of the exiles from fascist regimes, North America, and in particular the United States, was to become the most important location for Soviet exile historiography.[143] Interwar Czechoslovakia actively supported Russian and Ukrainian scholars who attempted to re-establish many of the institutions of higher learning in exile, including a Russian university and a Russian historical society which organised its own meetings, journal and book series. However, it proved

[141] I am deeply indebted to Edoardo Tortarolo, with whom I had several conversations and email exchanges on this topic and from whose publications on Italian exile historians I have learnt so much. See, for example, Tortarolo, 'Historians in Exile: Franco Venturi in Paris in the 1930s', in: D.K. Adams and M. Vaudagna (eds), *TransAtlantic Encounters. Public Uses and Misuses of History in Europe and the United States* (Amsterdam, 2000), and Tortarolo, 'Gaetano Salvemini: metodologo della storia', in: Patrizia Audenino (ed.), *Il Prezzo della Libertà: Gaetano Salvemini in Esilio (1925–1949)* (Soveria Mannelli, 2009), pp. 341–56.

[142] Stefan Wiederkehr, *Die eurasische Bewegung. Wissenschaft und Politik in der russischen Emigration der Zwischenkriegszeit und im postsowjetischen Russland* (Cologne, 2007).

[143] Tibor Frank, *Double Exile: Migrations of Jewish-Hungarian Professionals through Germany to the United States, 1919–1945* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 278–349.

impossible in Czechoslovakia to interest a younger cohort of students in Russian or Ukrainian history, so that no particular school of history emerged from this exile situation which otherwise was far more comfortable than more precarious exile situations elsewhere.[144] There were, of course, other examples of nation states welcoming exiled scholars and providing favourable conditions for their work, e.g. the Mexican state's foundation of the Colegio de Mexico (College of Mexico) for those scholars who had fled Franco's Spain, or, in the context of the prevailing anti-Bolshevism in the West, the willingness of Western academic institutions to provide a home for exiled scholars from the Soviet Union.[145] But all too often the exiles had to come to terms with the bitter insight that they were not really wanted by their host countries. Most European states in the interwar period implemented highly restrictive immigration policies which were hostile to those exiled by the totalitarian dictatorships. Whether the exiles were ultimately successfully integrated into their host countries depended on a variety of factors including the help provided by individual colleagues and particular institutions, and often also sheer luck.

In stark contrast to those historians who had been exiled by Italian Fascism and German National Socialism and who sought to rethink their respective national histories from the vantage points of 1923 and 1933 respectively, exiles from the Soviet Union did not seek to integrate 1917 into major new interpretations of national history. Russian historians in exile by and large stuck to traditional Russian interpretations of national historical development and chose to concentrate on church history, Russian history as part of wider European history and on Russian culture and literature. Thus, for example, the national poet, Puškin, was the object of a considerable amount of historical writing in the interwar period. It was almost as if Russian exile historians were determined to ignore 1917 and its significance for Russian national history.[146] If they dealt with 1917, it was either to argue that it had been a freak accident in an otherwise progressive development of the empire, or to suggest that it was the direct outcome of a bureaucratic state apparatus and a reactionary tsar unable to reform the system in time. But none of the exiled historians produced inspiring syntheses which gave the historical national master narrative a new twist. In line with their own education as positivist historians, they were satisfied with collecting materials, sources and manuscripts and they were hesitant to produce grand narratives.

In the 1930s national historians from the non-Soviet Russian republics were also forced to leave their university positions and go into exile. Many Ukrainian historians settled in Poland, although the Polish authorities remained suspicious of their activities, fearing that they might fuel irredentist movements in

[144] Elena Chinyaeva, *Russians outside Russia: The Emigre Community in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1938* (München, 2001).

[145] Henri Kamen, *The Disinherited. Exile and the Making of Spanish Culture, 1492–1975* (New York, 2007).

[146] Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad. A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration 1919–1939* (New York, 1990).

Poland. The Polish authorities abolished the existing chair in Ukrainian history at the University of L'vov (today's L'viv) for this reason, but Ukrainian scholars, working at the universities in Krakow and Warsaw, and especially the Ševčenko Scientific Society in L'vov, still remained of vital importance for maintaining a tradition of historical studies on Ukraine in the interwar period. In particular the publications of the historical section of the Ševčenko Society formed the most important platform for discussing Ukrainian national history in this period.

Some of the Communist exile historians who had fled fascism and settled in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s adopted the Stalin-imposed merger of nationalism and Marxism and produced national histories in exile which were at once class histories and ringing endorsements of the achievement of the nation. The nationalisation of Soviet historiography from the 1930s onwards was thus spread to Eastern Europe after 1945.[147] József Révai's (1898–1959) interpretation of the 1848 revolution in Hungary, and Johannes Robert Becher's (1891–1958) and Georg Lukács's (1885–1971) writings on the national history and thought of Germany are good examples of this 'national turn' of European historiographies exiled to the Soviet Union. Interpretations like theirs were to have a major impact on the writing of national history in Communist Eastern Europe after 1945.

Women in the Inter-war Historical Profession

The interwar period saw new opportunities for women in the historical profession. Sometimes these were related to the rise of new methods and fields of historical writing. In England, for example, many of a new generation of women historians, including Helen Cam (1885–1968), Eileen Power (1889–1940), Joan Thirsk (1922–2013), Lillian Knowles (1870–1926), Lucy Sutherland (1863–1935) and Lillian Penson (1896–1963), concentrated on the rising field of economic and social history.[148] One of the most outstanding Polish female historians of the interwar period was also an economic historian, Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska (1881–1964).[149] Special women's colleges in Oxford, Cambridge and London afforded opportunities for women historians in England. Even in National Socialist Germany, niche areas, such as East European historiography, and newly founded institutions such as the Volksdeutsche Forschungsgemeinschaften, allowed women to occupy positions on the margins of professional history.[150] Related disciplines, such as archaeology and paleography, were also often more open to women than

[147] Árpád von Klimó, 'Helden, Völker, Freiheitskämpfe. Zur Ästhetik stalinistischer Geschichtsschreibung in der Sowjetunion, der Volksrepublik Ungarn und der DDR', *Storia della Storiografia* 52 (2007), pp. 83–112.
[148] Gianna Pomata, 'Rejoinder to Pygmalion: the Origins of Women's History at the London School of Economics', in: Ilaria Porciani and Mary O'Dowd (eds), *History Women*, special issue of *Storia della Storiografia* 46 (2004), pp. 79–104.
[149] Tadeusz Paweł Rutkowski, 'Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska (1881–1964)' in Brock, Stanley and Wróbel (eds), *Nation and History*, pp. 336 ff.
[150] Heike Anke Berger, *Deutsche Historikerinnen, 1920–1970: Geschichte zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik* (Frankfurt/Main, 2007).

mainstream history. In Estonia, for example, the first woman to graduate in a historical discipline was Martha Schmiedeheim (1896–1981) in 1924 who went on to complete a doctorate in archaeology in 1944.[151] In Romania, Maria Holban (1901–1991), who had studied in Bucharest and Paris, was appointed a professor of Latin paleography at the Şcoala Superioară de Arhivistică (Superior School for Archivistics) in Bucharest in 1926.[152] In countries where the second doctorate (Habilitation) had been an additional hurdle, and sometimes bar, for women, the interwar period witnessed the first women taking this hurdle. In Austria, Erna Patzelt (1894–1987) paved the way in 1924 and was followed by Mathilde Uhlirz (1881–1966), who passed her *habilitation* in 1932 and went on to complete a major handbook on the history of Austria and its neighbouring countries that had been begun by her father.[153] In Czechoslovakia, Milada Paulová (1891–1970) followed suit in 1925. Even if women in most cases could not climb to the height of full professorships, professional careers were made possible, for example, through positions that became increasingly available in libraries. In Denmark, Ellen Jørgensen (1877–1948) became a senior librarian at Det Kongelige Bibliotek (Royal Library) in 1915. Overall numbers should, however, not be exaggerated: in 1928 only ten women held full-time, permanent positions in European universities and of those, about two thirds were located in Britain.[154]

Women were by no means immune to the predominant nationalism in the historical profession. In Germany, Selma Stern (1890–1981), developed a strong interest in gender history, writing on women as historical actors in the interwar period. However, the First World War brought forth strong sentiments of nationalism in her. Committed to the ideal of a German–Jewish symbiosis, she threw herself into the edition of sources on Prussian–Jewish history only to be disappointed by Germany's turn to National Socialism, which spelt the end of her academic career in Germany.[155] The racist redefinition of the national master narrative in National Socialist Germany left no space for Jewish historians and those who sought to uphold liberal and democratic values.

Conclusion

In the first half of the twentieth century the two world wars marked respective high points of historiographical nationalism in Europe. In both instances, historians authoritatively affirmed the national historical master narratives in support of the war efforts of their respective governments. The debates surrounding the war guilt question of the First World War had major repercussions on interwar politics,

[151] Aadu Must, 'Estonia', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 81.
[152] Murgescu, 'Romania', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 99.
[153] Exner, 'Austria', in: Porciani and Raphael (eds), *Atlas*, p. 147.
[154] Mary O'Dowd, 'Popular Writers: Women Historians, the Academic Community and National History Writing', in: Porciani and Tollebeek (eds), *Setting the Standards*, pp. 351–71.
[155] Marina Sassenberg, Selma Stern (1890–1981). Das Eigene in der Geschichte. Selbstentwürfe und Geschichtsentwürfe einer Historikerin (Tübingen, 2004).

with the German government-sponsored campaign successfully spreading the message of the injustice of the Versailles Peace Treaty. In the Second World War German historians even justified ethnic cleansing and genocide within the context of the National Socialist attempts to extend the borders of the German nation. The proximity of national historiography to politics was clearly visible in many other countries in interwar Europe, demonstrating the continuing high levels of politicisation of national historical writing. In particular, the newly founded nation states on the territories of those European empires that had disintegrated at the end of the First World War were usually keen to deploy history to underline the legitimacy of their new-found statehood. Contested borderlands became sites of intense struggle between different national histories in the 1920s and 1930s, ensuring that borders were often given a high priority in national histories.

In the politically charged atmosphere of the interwar period, it does not come as a surprise that the discipline hardly developed in a politics-free space. Liberalism and parliamentarism were under threat in a number of European nation states in the 1920s and 1930s, and as we have documented above at least for some countries, a weakening of liberal national master narratives contributed to their demise into more authoritarian forms of government. Historiography was to some extent a barometer of political change, reflecting and at the same time helping to pave the way for such change. At the extreme ends of the political spectrum were, on the one hand, the rise of fascist regimes to power and, on the other, the victory of Communism in the Soviet Union. Fascism and communism significantly reshaped historical professions in Europe and exiled many practising historians. The experience of exile could, as we have seen above, result in a productive rethinking of national historical master narratives. If Europe found itself in ruins in 1945, historiographical nationalism had to share the blame for the unprecedented forms of destruction of the Second World War. Would historians in the second half of the twentieth century be willing and able to learn from the dark lessons of the century's first half?