4 / Exporting Liberalism: New Politics and Old Democracies
/Cosponsored by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung/

26 – 28 April 2004   print this page

Conference organizers:

Walter Mller-Jentsch, N/A

Conference description:

INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE DUBROVNIKDon Frana Bulića 4, HR-20000 Dubrovnik, CroatiaTel: +385 20 413 626, Fax: +385 20 423 628E-mail: iuc@iuc.hrwww.iuc.hrINTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: Exporting Liberalism New Polities and Old DemocraciesDubrovnik, 26-28 April, 2004Conference Directors: Shlomo Avineri, Hebrew University, Jerusalem Silva Menarić, Zagreb Conference Content: Recent US intervention in Iraq and foremost the postconflict intentions there brought into full daylight more than a century old problem of Western democracies: how far is it possible to go in deploying liberal democratic institutions and applying them to surroundings with different traditions. The Balkans, partly Eastern Europe and now islamic states and political cultures clearly showed that the applicability of such Western actions was not being thought through, let alone defined. Neither military nor social scientists, did their analytical jobs. The goal of the Conference is to define the void, to give it names and topics and to start off further examinations.Invited speakers: Kevin D. Krause, Detroit; Silva Meznaric, Zagreb; Nenad Miscevic, Rijeka; Zarko Puhovski, Zagreb; Vesna Pusic, Zagreb; Andras Sajo, Budapest; Dan Schueftan, Haifa; Aleksandar Stulhofer, Zagreb; Ivan Vejvoda, Beograd; Mitja Zagar, Ljubljana. Participants registered (by March 15, 2004): 12, plus Divided Societies Course Graduate Students (15).Programme:Monday, April 26 Topic: Politics of Transition; Liberalism and New Democracies09.00 19.00 in Eastern Europe. The Mixed Success in Post-Communist Societies; Internal Conditions and External Forces.16.00 19.00 Speakers: Pusić, Vejvoda, agar, Sajo, tulhoferTuesday, April 27 Topic: Two Concepts of Freedom; Exporting Whose Liberalism?09.00 19.00 Speakers: Krause, Mičević, Puhovski16.00 19.00Wednesday, April 28 09.00 13.00 Topics: The Democratization of the Arab World; Cultural and Political Pluralism. Democracy, Democratization and Peace.16.00 19.00 Edward Said's Legacy: Causes and Excuses. Speakers: Shueftan, MenarićWorking languages: EnglishServices and facilities at IUC: Computer Room, Internet, Copying, Video, Library.All inquiries to IUC Secretariat, Ms Kapetanovic.iuc@iuc.hr Accommodation in Dubrovnik: Hotel Bellevue, P. Cingrije 7.hotel-bellevue@du.htnet.hrTel: 385 20 412 854Fax: 385 20 414 058For prices see: www.iuc.hrFor tourist info, mail to: tic-stradun@du-htnet.hrChildren: services available. Contact Secretariat. Contact Person: Ms Silva Meznaric silva.meznaric@zg.htnet.hr Tel/fax: 385 1 4614208Compiled: 02/04/2004Grant: The Conference has been selected by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung as 2004 IUC Fee Grantee. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: Exporting Liberalism New Polities and Old DemocraciesDubrovnik, 26-28 April, 2004Monday, 26 April, 10:00-13:00 Andras SajoLiberalism on back burner the Hungarian experienceOutlineINTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE DUBROVNIKDon Frana Bulića 4, HR-20000 Dubrovnik, CroatiaTel: +385 20 413 626, Fax: +385 20 423 628E-mail: iuc@iuc.hrwww.iuc.hr Clarification. Liberalism here refers to European (19th century) liberalism with strong emphasis on individual liberty and self-determination. The case study concerns Hungary but I take that the conclusions are applicable in most East Central European countries. In a strange combination of lack of understanding and the desire to be Western the Hungarian constitutional and early institutional transition to democracy was carried out under the spell of liberalism. Liberalism was, however, unsustainable under the pressure coming from (deeply rooted) welfarism, bureaucratic self-interest, clientelism, corporativism, nationalism. IN a few years liberalism became a dirty word and liberal principled politics is considered politically suicidal. Deliberate abuse of liberal positions also contributed to such developments. International and domestic considerations, however, did not allow for an open rupture with liberal fundamentals. Instead of it a slow erosion took place. The erosion is well demonstrated in Hungarian Constitutional Court decisions. The phenomenon is partly post-communist, partly it can be explained by a general trend in political liberalism that was already observed by Lord Acton, namely that liberty being dear to minorities such minorities have to find allies; such alliances resulted in deformation and disaster. (See also the erosion of liberalism under Bismarck and in the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1867.) Nevertheless, the post 1989 Hungarian public institutions were formed in a liberal spirit and hypocrisy and impotence helps such liberal spirit to exercise a ghost-like influence.INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: Exporting Liberalism New Polities and Old DemocraciesDubrovnik, 26-28 April, 2004Wednesday, 28 April, 10:00-13.00 Andras SajoLiberalism on back burner the Hungarian experienceOutlineINTER-UNIVERSITY CENTRE DUBROVNIKDon Frana Bulića 4, HR-20000 Dubrovnik, CroatiaTel: +385 20 413 626, Fax: +385 20 423 628E-mail: iuc@iuc.hrwww.iuc.hrCultural and Political Preconditions forModernization, Democratization and Peaceful Coexistencein the Middle East Dan Schueftan It would take a revolutionary change of present trends in the Arab World to produce a climate conducive for modernization, democratization and peaceful coexistence in the Middle East. While the global and some of the regional circumstances have become more favorable in recent decades for a positive change in this direction than they have been for a long time, the most important precondition for progress on these issues - the cultural predisposition - is not only lagging behind, but indeed becoming more difficult than ever before. The external circumstances - global and regional - became more favorable thanks to the collapse of the Soviet empire and the trend towards democratization that swept the globe. The first deprived the radical and most oppressive regimes in the region from their superpower shield, which rendered them immune to regime change. The new trend towards democratization may not have produced liberal democracies or open societies, but it proved that even in a traditional and authoritarian environment, a gradual process of political reform could provide a measure of freedom hitherto unknown in these parts, that can offer hope for further progress in this direction in the future. The Arab states are the only major exception to this trend, conspicuous because unsubstantiated expectations of democratization in the Arab World have been prevalent in the West for so long. Needless to say, the Arab World is not a monolith in that (or any other) regard. Jordan and Egypt offer a far more relaxed and palatable version of authoritarianism than the brutality of Sadam Husseins Iraq, the oppression of Assads republican dynasty, or the corrupt and profoundly irresponsible Palestinian cleptocracy. But beyond these differences, there is a political and cultural reality that transcends boundaries and regimes, which proved to date to constitute an insurmountable impediment to any major change towards modernization and democratization. The Arabs exhibited in the last two centuries unique inadequacies in coping with the modern world. The aggressive challenge of the West effected most parts of the world and caused major disruptions of traditional societies everywhere, but the Arabs had a special difficulty meeting this challenge. This difficulty is rooted in the pervasive perception that the Arabs are destined for greatness and glory at the present and in the future, to match the outstanding achievements of their ancestors in the distant past. While every culture, nation and creed celebrate their unique distinctions, the Arabs tend, more than others, to dwell on the juxtaposition of their heritage of political and military power, with their present impotence and national humiliation. While others may lament their fall from greatness but carry on, Arabs often fail to come to terms with the gap between the reverence their creativity and innovation won them in the distant past, and the disrespect they suffer because of the failure they admit to in the present, and their dim perspective for the foreseeable future. For many years, hopes Arabs entertained for a profound change in the balance of power were potent enough to keep the mainstream in the Arab World from despair. In the second half of the twentieth century, the most conspicuous manifestations of such hopes were Abd al-Nassers messianic movement in the 1950s and 1960s, and the accumulation of massive political and economic resources thanks to the energy crisis in the 1970s. But since the 1980s, particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, mainstream Arab elites came to realize that not only the present is depressing for their society in this regard, but also that the foreseeable future may not be much better. Some of them came to recognize that the problems the Arab society is suffering from are structural, and may lead toward a dead-end. In the last two decades this realization is spreading and deepening more than ever. In recent years it became acceptable to the point in which even Arab leaders sometimes confess to the weaknesses and inadequacies of their own countries and offer little hope for a speedy and fundamental solution. It is probably this enormous and inexplicable gap between the world as it should have been and the world as it really is that can explain, more than any other single cause, the prevalent gloom, sometime even despair, in the Arab World. It may also explain their severe political and cultural consequences. If two centuries of persistent attempts to bridge this gap have come to naught, if all attempts to emulate the West, as well as the attempts to defy its superior power and match its achievements have only led to Arab self-admitted impotence and inability to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century, something must be profoundly wrong. Many in the Arab World have reached the conclusion that only an all-encompassing conspiracy can explain how those destined for greatness are humiliated in their own region, while those condemned to subservience enjoy power and command respect. In such a conspirative environment, Modernization, democratization, and peaceful coexistence are presented with a formidable impediment. A determination to deal with the world in a realistic way and understand the real causes of ones problems, may not be a sufficient condition for a modern and peaceful democracy, but it is certainly a necessary condition. In an environment in which the CIA is perceived as responsible for the collapse of the Twin Towers, the Jewish Lobby as dictating American foreign policy, and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as the root cause of the Arab predicament, it is difficult to promote any of the three. An addiction to such a perception of history and political life, not only makes it impossible to appraise the problems the Arabs are facing; it also represents an abdication of responsibility for their development, and hence, all but precludes the chance to deal with these problems effectively. Such abdication of responsibility seems to be the greatest cultural obstacle for Arabs and much of the Third World in their endeavor to extricate themselves from perpetual inaptitude, poverty and failure. Instead of taking responsibility, they resort too often to the excuses of Colonialism, Globalization and Occupation. Colonialism indeed had a disruptive, sometimes horrible, effect on the lives and prospects of the colonized peoples, but pinning the long-lasting failure of these societies on colonialism half a century after its abolition simply does not hold water. Globalization is often unfair and indeed extremely difficult to cope with for underdeveloped societies, but some have worked very hard to benefit from it, while other focus on handouts and loan-forgiveness, not even trying to adjust themselves to the new reality. One generation ago, the Arabs were given an opportunity of a magnitude no one else was fortunate enough to benefit from, when the oil producers accumulated trillions of dollars in revenues, for goods they did nothing to produce or develop. This provided the Arab States - chiefly the oil producers, but also the other states, who received many billions of dollars from them since the 1970s - with an economic instrument that could have catapulted their economies and societies to a much improved position of competition in the global market. One generation later the Arab States are worse off than they were before this enormous bonanza. The unique chance was squandered on corruption and war. Palestinians and other Arabs did suffer from Israeli and American occupation, but the attempts to pin their failure in the fields of democratization, peaceful coexistence and modernization on that occupation is more an excuse than the fundamental reason. The occupation came about, in the first place, because those who came to be occupied refused peaceful coexistence and opted for war. It persisted primarily because they refused to change course towards compromise. The failure of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, or the Palestinians, to offer their societies a chance of democratization or modernization, did not start with the Israeli or American occupation. When Israel terminated its occupation of Egyptian territory a quarter of a century ago, this did not change one bit the autocratic nature of the Egyptian regime. When the Palestinian national movement took over the populated territories in the beginning of the Oslo Process, it introduced a corrupt, violent and autocratic system that often limited basic freedoms even more than the Israeli occupation. Although it is not a democracy by any stretch of the imagination, occupied Lebanon is doing better in this respect, than the Syrian occupier. Colonialism, Globalization and Occupation may sound as convincing excuses, but the real issue is responsibility, or rather, the lack thereof. Addiction to these excuses is a major impediment to an effective response to the real problems. Conspirative theories only deepen this addiction. All successful attempts to bring about modernization and democracy started with a bold look of ones own society, rather than with blaming evil external forces. While the Arab World is somewhat more open recently to admit many of its shortcomings, it is only very rarely willing to accept responsibility for them, or to make the major changes that are required in order to amend them. One important example is the status of women in the Arab-Muslim World. While there can be no disagreement about the crucial role of womens equality as a precondition to democratization and modernization, the Islamization of large parts of Arab society exacerbated, rather than alleviated the problem. Hopes concerning democratization and modernization in the Arab World as a result of free access to information or external influence were rapidly shattered at the end of the twentieth century. The instruments of information that opened much of the world outside the Middle East and helped produce a more open and pluralistic society seldom had this effect in the Arab World. Satellite Television did expose Arabs to criticism of their own regime and brought more pictures and voices from the outside world, but its most potent effect was to fabricate a convoluted version of history and world events, in which Arabs are invariably the innocent victims, while others (chiefly the U.S. and Israel) habitually represent ultimate evil. The Internet proved again that what counts in the existing environment in the Middle East is rather what Arabs seek to confirm then what they have available to challenge their perceptions and prejudices. The new options of civil society proved immeasurably more effective in the hands of radical Islamic Movements than in the service of those who seek modernization, democratization and peaceful coexistence. What we have seen in the Arab World and part of the Third World at the turn of the century, was much more an attempt to re-define and distort democracy human rights and other basic values of the open society system, in a way designed to legitimize the autocratic, totalitarian and oppressive regimes, than a willingness to progress towards a more pluralistic system. The UN and other international organizations play a very negative role in this respect, since they are dominated by such regimes and because their success to distort democratic terms beyond recognition is not even seriously challenged, let alone de-legitimized by the European democracies. All this does not mean that there is no hope for the Arab World ever changing towards democracy, modernity and peaceful coexistence. It only helps explain why precious little has changed recently in a positive direction and why significant relevant indicators point in the opposite direction. It also suggests that in the present environment the necessary cultural preconditions are extremely difficult to meet and take a long time to produce major results. The problem is that time is not neutral: While those in the Arab World who want these changes struggle with the impediments discussed above, they can offer only little consolation to the Arab political public that suffers everyday from the consequences of the Arab failure in the last generations to adapt to the modern world. These revolutionary changes are not easy even for a self-assured and successful society; for one that is frustrated and humiliated by most everybody else passing it by, it is so much more difficult. 301Chapter 12SOCIO-CULTURAL VALUES, ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT AND POLITICALSTABILITY AS CORRELATES OFTRUST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION*Ivan RimacIvo Pilar Institute for Social ResearchZagrebAleksandar tulhoferFaculty of PhilosophyZagrebABSTRACTThis paper provides a comparative empirical analysis of social valuesin Croatia, the European Union (EU), the countries joining in the firstround, and a group of European countries outside the EU. Following upon the analysis of the data obtained in international research into Europeanvalues carried out at the end of the 90s on national samples of mostEuropean countries, the authors have endeavoured to determine the differencesin the spread of post-material values and the scope of social capital.The objective is to define where, in terms of social values, Croatia is currentlylocated, and thus to sketch out its readiness or lack of readiness forjoining the EU. In the second part, the paper offers a comparative analysisof factors that affect the level of public confidence in the EU.* The authors took an equal part in the writing of this paper. We would like to thank theanonymous reviewer for comments and proposals that have removed at least some of theshortcomings.Key words:socio-cultural values, post-materialism, social capital, transition costs,confidence in the European Union, CroatiaINTRODUCTIONAccording to figures from the Ministry for European Integration(www.mei.hr), most citizens of Croatia want to join the EU. Althoughin 2003 the percentage of those who think it is necessary to join the EUhas fallen since 2000 (74% as against 78%), almost three quarters of therespondents still think that such a course of events would be positive.Is this entirely an assessment of personal gain, neglecting any possibleeffects of integration on the country as a whole? Figures show a logicallink between the assessment of personal and national benefit from joiningthe EU. Thus, 66% expect a higher standard of living as a consequence,and as many as 75% expect general progress.The objective of this paper is to show how distant from or closeto the EU Croatia is from the point of view of values. We are interestedin how much the values that we consider stimulating to developmentare widespread in Croatia as compared with the EU, or how much, toput it another way, the EU is different from us. The magnitude of thisdifference is important both for a country that wants to become a member(greater differences imply greater difficulties in adjustment to theEU system of standards) and for those who decide to take on the newmembers. An example of the latter point can be found in the mutedvoices that consider the values in Turkey, a Muslim country, impossibleto harmonise with those of the European tradition.In order to make the comparison, the distribution of values, orsets of values, is presented separately for three groups of countries: theEU members, the accession countries, and the countries that are not partof the EU. In the empirical analyses that follow, we start from theassumption that individual values that reflect social, political or economicdimensions can be concisely presented and analyzed (tulhoferand Rimac, 2002; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2002). In order to do so, weuse three theoretical models. The first of them, the theory of post-materialism,defines the change in global values as a shift from materialistto post-materialist values. The second model, the social capital theory,focuses on social cohesion, social trust and cooperativeness. Recentresearch (Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Torsvik, 2000) has pointed to302a positive correlation between post-materialism and social capital onthe one hand, and economic growth and political development on theother. The third model introduces some specific features of the processof post-communist transition (tulhofer, 2000).Since in this paper we also wish to sketch out the measures thatcould stimulate convergence in values, in the second part of the paperwe analyse the structure of trust and confidence in the EU. In this part weidentify the political, economic and social predictors of trust in the EU.In the next step, we use this analysis to outline a set of specific recommendationsregarding Croatia's ambition to become a member of the EU.THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:THE THREE MODELSThe importance of culture, of specific social values, of institutionsand manners (tradition) for economic growth and political valuesis no longer controversial. This is best shown by the recently inaugurateddevelopment project of the World Bank called Social Capital forDevelopment (www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital). However, thequestion of the empirical measurement of social values is more complexand controversial (Grix, 2001). In order to be able to avoid makingconclusions on the basis of simple indicators such as the question:Do you support democracy?, which avoids the issue of the differentunderstandings of democracy and of conforming to social expectations,we base the analysis of the distribution of specific values on three theoreticalconstructs. Each of these is an interlinked set of political, economicand socio-cultural values.Model of post-materialist changeThe model of social change proposed by the American politicalscientist Ronald Inglehart is one of the most theoretically elegant andempirically most investigated theories of globalisation (Abramson andInglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997). The model starts off from theassumption that social development is no chaotic and accidentalprocess, but is inextricably linked with a specific structure of values(Inglehart, 1995). Although the claim that socio-cultural values can begrouped into coherent sets, value orientations, is not new, the innova-303tiveness of Ingleharts model rests in the thesis that value orientationsare both the cause and effect of economic and political development. Inthis way, there is a high degree of similarity between the developedcountries, as well as between the less developed countries, but notbetween these two groups. Ingleharts assumptions, it can easily be seen,are based on the modernization theory and postulate linear development.When he talks of value systems, Inglehart distinguishes three:traditional, modern and post-modern. The last two are global consequencesof the industrial or the post-industrial revolution. As for thepost-modern orientation, its beginning is usually placed in the 1960swhen in the developed countries of the West the post-modern transitioncommenced; this was characterised by the spread of what were calledpost-materialist values. Table 1 presents in a condensed way the transformationof values described. At the micro level, the most recentchanges are shown in the growth of the number of post-materialists,particularly in the younger generations (Abramson and Inglehart, 1995;Inglehart, 1997). At the same time, there is a decline in the popularityof materialist values, which were dominant in industrial societies.Table 1 Materialist and post-materialist value systems304Modern societies(domination of materialistvalues)Post-modern societies(domination of postmaterialistvalues)Fundamental social goal Economic growth andpolitical stabilityDevelopment of humanrights and libertiesPersonal ends Maximising utility;growth in purchasingpowerMaximising individuality;development of personalidentitiesCentral social authority Rational and legal (laws) Self-regulationWhat is post-materialist development conditioned by? Accordingto Inglehart, it is mainly the consequence of the growth of prosperity. Therelationship between dominant social values and the level of social developmentshown primarily through standard of living Inglehart defines interms of two linked hypotheses (Inglehart, 1995). The first of them, theshortage hypothesis, puts forward the idea that individual preferences arecaused by the socio-economic situation. In conditions of shortage,motives concerning pure existence and survival prevail, and in conditionsof abundance, those that transcend them. The socialisation hypothesis, onthe other hand, offers a mechanism of value internalisation, stressing thecrucial importance of the process of early socialisation. Growing up in astable environment, security and prosperity stimulates the internalisationand development of post-modern values. The rising importance of thepost-materialist value orientation is seen in the new civil initiatives, in thegrowth of ecological sensitivity, in growing tolerance, multiculturalismand in cosmopolitanism, in the increasing emphasis on human rights andpersonal identities, the strengthening of the idea of self-regulation and therejection of classical political ideologies.i Thus the expectation of themodel is that support for the EU will reflect the spread of post-materialist,transnational values in the national population.iiSocial capital theoryThe idea of social capital is probably the most popular of allthose that have emerged in the social sciences in the last ten years (Grix,2001; Hospers and Van Lochem, 2002).iii The reason for this should besought in the dissatisfaction with the predictive capacities of the classicaltheory of modernisation, according to which growth and developmentare predicated on universal and rational institutions. Against thispostulate, a series of investigations have pointed to the mediating role ofculture, which in some cases supports and in other cases thwarts or holdsup development. Specific norms and collective habits can, behind thefaade of formal institutions, make a mockery of market and democraticcompetition. An unpropitious cultural matrix results in chronic economic,political and social backwardness (tulhofer, 2001:53-78). Thefirst appears in inadequate growth, the second in prolonged politicalinstability and undemocratic proceedings, and the last in general lack oftrust, cynicism, opportunism and a high level of social pathology.What is the general trait of a propitious cultural matrix?According to social capital theorists (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993;Torsvik, 2000; Fukuyama, 2000), its features are mutual trust, generallyaccepted standards of cooperation and social networks or links betweenmembers of the community. According to the influential Putnam study(1993) of the development of Italy, the whole of these features socialcapitaliv - is the generator of economic development and political stability.Unlike the closed circle of underdevelopment, in societies/communitiesrich in social capital, a positive development loop is at work: culturalhabits produce wealth that then in turn increases the social capital.305Empirically, social capital consists of three dimensions (Figure1). The first of them, trust, denotes initial readiness to cooperate andnot only with members of the family or acquaintances (Fukuyama,1995; Mistal, 1996). The second dimension, association/connectedness,and the related collective actions, make possible the direct experienceof cooperation and its advantages, such as the fulfilment of interests thatare beyond the scope of individual action. Social linkage or networkingthus works as a school for trust and collaboration. The last dimension,respect for standards or civility,v is at the same time the result of theworking of the first two dimensions and it is their support and buttress.Figure 1 Structure of social capital306Respect fornorms (civility)AssociationTrustWhat kind of relation between social capital and trust in the EUdoes this model predict? Although the theoretical link is not yet clearlyexpressed, one should expect (as in the case of post-materialism) thatsocial capital should have a positive effect on the way the EU is seen,both because of its encouragement of social and economic cooperationand because of the links related to the possibility of wider networking.But an alternative interpretation is also possible. If the process ofEuropean integration, and hence the institutions and practice of the EU,are seen as threats to established, local and national, networks (McLaren,2002), social capital will be negatively correlated with trust in the EU.Situational reaction modelNeither the post-materialism nor the social capital theory takesinto account the specific, transitional features of European post-communistsocieties. Within the universal postulates of the Inglehart theory,such socio-cultural specificities are of secondary importance and areresponsible for short-lasting oscillations in the general trend of postmaterialism(Inglehart, 1995). In the second model, socio-cultural traitsare central, but only in a quantitative sense (Putnam, 1993). Countriescan thus be distinguished according to quantity but not according totype (or quality) of social capital.Considering that both models display a tendency to neglect thetransitional reality of post-communism - a process of such great importancefor the countries of C, S and SE Europe - we have decided toinclude a third explanatory model into our theoretical framework. Itsrole is to contribute to the interpretation of the structure of trust in theEU by taking into account socioeconomic costs of transition.The situational reaction model (tulhofer, 2000:149-177)assumes that in moments of major social changes, the perception andevaluation of the current economic political and social conditions willdetermine the dominant values. For example, observation of a large numberof injustices, irregularities and abuses during the process of economicand political changes, and, in particular, the failure to penalise them,will result in widespread cynicism and opportunism. Starting out fromthe definition of post-communism as fundamental change in economic,political and social life, one accompanied by vast transitional costs (individualand collective), the model predicts that the perception of the EUwill be considerably affected by the respondents assessment of thecourse of the transitional processes to date. Since the citizens of countriesthat do not belong to the EU know as a rule very little about the EU institutionsand their activities, their estimate of the EU will be a reflection ofthe effectiveness of the relevant domestic institutions (Anderson, 1998).METHODOLOGYSampleIn the analyses we use data collected in the third wave of theEuropean Values Survey (EVS), a research project that started in 1980with the aim of providing systematic monitoring of the value orientations307(concerning religion, morality, work, politics and society) of the citizensin European countries. The initial survey in 10 Western European countriesin 1981 was extended in 1990 and, again, in 1999/2000 when it coveredthirty-three countries. Thus the data collected in 1999/2000 are agood basis for the comparison of the values and standpoints of people indifferent European countries. In all the countries, a single questionnairewas used and rigorous procedures and checks were used to secure theequivalence of questions after translation. In each country a probabilisticsample of the over-18 population was polled, and all the samples consistedof at least 1,000 respondents. The Croatian part of the EVS was carriedout by a research team led by J. Baloban of the Catholic TheologyFaculty in Zagreb (Rimac and rpi, 2000). Under the guidance of theUniversity of Tilburg Research Centre (WORC, Tilburg University) andthe Central Archive in Cologne, data were checked and aggregatedenabling comparative analyses. In this paper we use the fourth revisionof the 1999/2000 dataset.InstrumentsThe measure of post-materialism as opposed to materialism representsa standard recoding of the selection of preferred objectives ofthe country. The respondents were asked to choose two out of fouritems offered (keeping order in the state; giving more rights to peopleto go on record about important decisions of the government; fightagainst the rise in prices; protection of liberty of speech). Their task wasto select the first and the second most important societal goal in theirrespective countries. If they chose the first and third goal, which correspondto materialism, then they were classified as materialists. If theychose two goals that suggest post-materialist viewpoints, they wereclassified as post-materialist, while respondents that chose one materialistand one post-materialist goal were placed in the mixed orientationgroup. In the regression analysis, a greater value of the index of postmaterialismindicates a greater acceptance of post-materialist values.The opportunism index is an average response value on two questionsasking if it is acceptable to evade tax if you have the chance and toreceive bribes at work. The correlation between the variables is moderate(r = .38). Higher values on the scale indicate greater opportunism.The trust in the institutions of the countrys political system indexis the arithmetical mean of answers on a scale of one to four, in whichlower values denote complete trust, and higher values complete lack of308trust in the institutions evaluated. The following institutions were includedin the index: church, army, education system, press, unions, police,parliament, civil service, social security, health care system and judiciary.The reliability of the index is satisfactory (Cronbach alpha = .83).The Social networking indicator, that is, the indicator of theinvolvement of citizens in civil initiatives is a variable that measuresthe frequency of spending time with people in clubs and voluntaryorganisations (non-governmental sector). Respondents were given ascale with the following responses: not at all, a few times a year, onceor twice a month, every week.Generalised trust was measured by the following question: Ingeneral, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you haveto be cautious in your dealings with people?Trust in norms was measured indirectly, through respondent's perceptionof the respect for/violation of norms in his or her community. Thelogic of using this perception of civility index was as follows: the moreothers respect norms, the greater the motivation of the respondent to dothe same. The likelihood that an actor will respect norms depends, substantially,on his or her perception of the relevant procedures of others.Such behavioural strategy is doubly rational in a cost/benefit sense, aswell as socially (maintaining one's reputation). The perception of civilityindex is the arithmetical mean of answers to ten questions about howwidespread violation of norms is in respondent's place of residence.vi Ascale with four points was used (almost all, many, some, almost no one).The reliability of the index is satisfactory (Cronbach alpha = .80).Satisfaction with the development of democracy is measured bythe question: How satisfied are you with the development of democracyin our country? As an indicator of satisfaction with the governmentwe used the following question: People have various opinionsabout the manner and system in which the country is governed. On thescale indicate your opinion about how things are. Respondents wereoffered a 10-point scale, with 1 being very bad and 10 being very good.GDP data were not an original part of the EVS, but were addedsubsequently in order to quantify the effect of national economy onrespondents' attitudes and values.RESULTS I: SOCIO-CULTURAL DIFFERENCESIn this section we present the results of the statistical analyses ofvalue orientations. The first part is a descriptive analysis of the spread309of the distinct value orientations, particularly of post-materialism andthose related to social capital, in three groups of countries: EU members,accession countries and countries that are not members, includingCroatia. We consider this discussion an important one, especially in thelight of the future of the collective European identity that the idea of theEU idea postulates. A European people are not imaginable, asPrentoulis (2001:196) observes, as an outcome of common history orculture, but only as the product of newly formed political values.Figure 2 Comparison of percent of materialists, postmaterialists and mixedtype persons in different countries (%)310materialist mixed postmaterialists1009080706050403020010AustriaItalySwedenNetherlandsBelgiumSpainFranceGermanyGreeceDenmarkIrelandFinlandPortugalEU countriesSloveniaCzech RepublicPolandLithuaniaSlovakiaLatviaEstoniaHungaryAccession countriesCroatiaTurkeyRomaniaBelarusUkraineBulgariaRussiaCountries outside the EUFigure 2 shows the distribution of post-material values. In linewith the results of an earlier work (Inglehart and Baker, 2000), our datashow considerable differences in the presence of post-materialism inthe three groups of countries (F=1047.7; p